OpenClaw macOS Always-On

Run OpenClaw as a system-level LaunchDaemon on macOS for 24/7 operation, surviving screen lock, logout, and user switching. Uses caffeinate to prevent sleep....

This package will run OpenClaw as a system LaunchDaemon (requires sudo) which is consistent with its goal, but take these precautions before installing: 1) Inspect the install.sh and the plist yourself instead of piping curl | bash from an unfamiliar GitHub account. 2) Do NOT allow the gateway token to be written into a world-readable plist. If you must set a token, store it in a file with restrictive permissions (600 owned by you) or use launchctl to set environment variables at runtime, or better, use the macOS Keychain and have the service retrieve it securely. 3) If you don't need system-wide uptime (survive logout), prefer a LaunchAgent (no sudo) to reduce privilege and exposure. 4) Be aware caffeinate prevents system sleep and may harm laptop battery life. 5) If you proceed, change /Library/LaunchDaemons/ai.openclaw.gateway.plist permissions to restrict access or remove the OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_TOKEN from the plist and inject it at service start with a safer mechanism. If you want, I can suggest a safer plist pattern or a modified install script that avoids storing secrets in a world-readable file.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: openclaw-macos-always-on Version: 1.0.1 The skill is designed to install OpenClaw as a macOS LaunchDaemon for 24/7 operation, which requires system-level persistence and `sudo` privileges. While its stated purpose is legitimate, it is classified as suspicious due to several high-risk behaviors: it installs a system-wide service (`/Library/LaunchDaemons/ai.openclaw.gateway.plist`), uses `sudo` for installation, and embeds the `OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_TOKEN` (a sensitive credential) directly into the plist file. Although the `SKILL.md` documentation transparently discusses these security considerations and the service runs as the user (not root), the direct handling of a sensitive token in a file and the establishment of system-level persistence represent significant vulnerabilities if the system is compromised, even without clear evidence of malicious intent for self-exploitation or exfiltration to external parties.