OpenClaw Guide Maintenance

Comprehensive guide for installing, configuring, operating, and troubleshooting OpenClaw — a self-hosted, multi-channel AI agent gateway. Use when the user a...

This skill is a documentation bundle for OpenClaw and appears coherent with that purpose. Because it mentions many local credential files, token-file usage, and prompt internals, do the following before enabling it: 1) Manually scan SKILL.md (and the referenced files) for any lines that explicitly instruct an assistant to 'ignore', 'override', or 'replace' system prompts or previous instructions — these are prompt-injection indicators. 2) Never paste API keys, gateway tokens, or private credential file contents into chat; use secure secret stores or token-file references on your host instead. 3) Verify the skill origin if you plan to act on its operational commands — there is no homepage and source is unknown; prefer official docs or a trusted registry. 4) If you intend to follow its commands on a running Gateway, run them locally in a controlled environment (not by sending secrets to an agent). If you want, provide the specific sections you'd like checked in detail and I can search the text for explicit prompt-injection or exfiltration instructions.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: openclaw-guide-maintenance Version: 2026.3.24 The provided files constitute a comprehensive documentation suite and instruction set for OpenClaw, a self-hosted AI agent gateway. The SKILL.md file serves as a reference guide for an AI agent to assist users with installation, configuration, and maintenance tasks. While the skill grants the agent access to high-risk capabilities such as shell execution (exec.md), file system access (tools.md), and browser automation (browser.md), these tools are clearly aligned with the stated purpose of system administration. The documentation includes extensive security hardening guides (security.md), sandboxing configurations (sandboxing.md), and mandatory approval workflows (exec_approvals.md) to mitigate these risks. No evidence of malicious intent, data exfiltration, or unauthorized persistence was found; the curl-to-bash installation method in install.md is a standard deployment pattern for this ecosystem.