Safely inject API keys from 1Password into macOS LaunchAgent plists using PlistBuddy. Use when running OpenClaw on macOS and storing secrets in 1Password — a...

This skill largely does what it says — it reads secrets from 1Password and writes them into the OpenClaw gateway's LaunchAgent plist. Important considerations before installing: - The script contradicts its claim of 'avoiding plaintext keys on disk' by writing secrets (including the OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN) into the plist at ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.gateway.plist. That plist is stored on disk and may be readable by processes or users with access to your account. If your goal is to avoid persistent plaintext secrets, this approach is not achieving that. - Consider whether the gateway truly needs the 1Password service account token in its environment. If not required, remove injecting OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN from the script to reduce blast radius. - Ensure the 1Password service account has minimal, read-only scope and rotate it regularly. Use strict filesystem permissions on ~/.config/openclaw/.op-service-token and on the plist file. - Review whether you prefer ephemeral session-based access (op session tokens) rather than storing a persistent token file under ~/.config/openclaw. - Be aware the script restarts the LaunchAgent (it will run the gateway with the injected env vars). Also note it sets OTLP_ENDPOINT to localhost:4317 (telemetry) and writes SHERPA paths—ensure those values are intended. - If you want stronger guarantees against on-disk secrets, investigate alternatives such as: having the gateway integrate with 1Password at runtime, using macOS keychain APIs, or using launchctl setenv for ephemeral environment settings (though that has its own limits). If you proceed, audit the plist file permissions after a run, limit the service account privileges, and consider removing injection of the OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN from the script.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: gateway-env-injector Version: 1.0.0 The skill automates the extraction of multiple sensitive API keys (OpenAI, Anthropic, Gemini, etc.) from 1Password and injects them into a macOS LaunchAgent plist. While the script `scripts/inject-gateway-env.sh` performs its stated function, it involves high-risk credential handling and system persistence modification. Furthermore, the `SKILL.md` documentation contains a misleading security claim that it avoids plaintext keys on disk, when in fact `PlistBuddy` writes these secrets into a standard plist file in the user's Library folder.