BT下载助手，支持 aria2 RPC 模式下载、监控和自动做种

This skill appears to implement an aria2-based BT helper, but there are security concerns you should consider before installing or running it: - RPC exposure: The plugin starts aria2 with --enable-rpc and --rpc-listen-all but does not set an rpc-secret. That will expose aria2's RPC interface to the network and allow remote control of downloads if your host is reachable. If you use this, configure an rpc-secret and/or restrict the RPC bind address to localhost. - Command injection risk: The plugin constructs shell commands (child_process.exec) that include user-provided values such as download directories and possibly URLs. If the agent or other users can supply crafted input, this could lead to command injection. Only use in trusted environments or after adding proper input sanitation/escaping. - Privilege elevation for install: The install path runs apt-get with sudo; this requires admin rights and will modify the system. - Network calls: The tool fetches trackers from a remote GitHub URL and uses curl; ensure your environment policy allows those requests and that you trust the source. - Mitigations: run the skill in an isolated VM or container, verify and/or modify the plugin to: 1) require or set --rpc-secret, 2) avoid --rpc-listen-all (or bind explicitly to localhost), 3) avoid passing unsanitized user input to shells (use execFile/spawn with args), and 4) review the remainder of the plugin code (the truncated portion) to confirm no hidden endpoints or exfiltration. If you cannot audit or modify the code, avoid running it on sensitive machines or networks. Additional information that would raise confidence: the rest of plugin.ts showing how it handles user-supplied urls/paths, explicit support for rpc-secret configuration, or explicit input sanitization.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: bt-download Version: 1.0.0 The skill bundle provides BitTorrent management functionality via aria2 but contains several high-risk vulnerabilities. In `plugin.ts`, the `bt_start_rpc` tool is vulnerable to shell command injection because the `downloadDir` parameter is interpolated directly into a command string without sanitization. Additionally, the `bt_download` tool allows for arbitrary file reading if a user-provided path ends in `.torrent`, and the `bt_install_aria2` tool executes high-privilege `sudo apt-get` commands. While these capabilities are aligned with the stated purpose, the lack of input validation and the use of broad permissions pose a security risk.