Agent Swarm

Decentralized agent-to-agent task protocol on XMTP. Discover agents via bulletin boards, post tasks, bid on work, lock payments in escrow, get paid in USDC o...

What to check before installing or running this skill: - Do not paste your real private key into .env until you audit the code. The skill expects WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY and RPC details — use an ephemeral wallet with minimal funds for testing. - Inspect cron-message.txt and any scripts referencing /home/oryx/.openclaw/... or .x_credentials. Those instructions ask to read local credential files and post to api.x.com (Twitter/X) — unrelated to the protocol and a potential exfiltration path. Remove or ignore these scripts if you don't want social‑posting behavior. - Review package.json and package-lock.json for third‑party packages that will be installed (they run code at runtime). Consider installing in an isolated environment (container, VM) and do an offline code review first. - Verify the escrow contract address on BaseScan (the SKILL.md points to a contract address and BaseScan link). Confirm its source and that it behaves as claimed before locking funds. - Avoid running live-demo or scripts that auto-swap funds (Uniswap/autoswap) on mainnet until you understand wallet-swapping logic and approvals. - If you need the feature but want minimal risk: run the demo on XMTP dev/test and Base testnet with an ephemeral wallet, and remove/disable any cron or social media automation files. If anything is unclear, ask the publisher for justification of the social‑posting automation and for an explicit list of required environment variables and their purposes. Refuse to provide unrelated credentials (OAuth tokens from other tools) to this skill.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: xmtp-agent-swarm Version: 4.0.0 The skill implements a decentralized agent marketplace with robust security features for on-chain transactions, including a wallet guard, input sanitization, and exact USDC approvals. However, the `scripts/push-state.sh` and `cron-message.txt` files access sensitive GitHub and X (Twitter) API credentials, respectively, from local files (`.gh_classic_token`, `.x_credentials`) and use them to interact with external services. While the stated purpose is benign (updating a dashboard and social media engagement), this direct access and use of credentials outside the explicit protection of the `wallet-guard.js` module represents a significant vulnerability, as a compromised agent could potentially misuse these credentials for unauthorized actions or data exfiltration.