WeCom Task Manager

Manage, track, and update enterprise WeCom tasks and goals with creation, progress, status reports, filtering, and dependency handling for authorized agents.

This skill appears to implement what it claims (WeCom smart-sheet task management) but has implementation and metadata inconsistencies and at least one concrete security weakness: - Inconsistency: The code requires mcporter (hardcoded path) and workspace MCP configuration, but the registry metadata lists no required binaries or credentials. Ask the publisher to declare mcporter as a required binary and to document where credentials are stored. - Command injection risk: run_mcporter builds a shell command containing JSON args and calls subprocess.run(..., shell=True). If any task fields (titles, descriptions, output_url, etc.) come from untrusted sources, they could be crafted to break out of the JSON quoting and execute arbitrary shell commands. Before installing, request a fix to run mcporter using a safe argument list (avoid shell=True and pass args as a list) or to properly escape inputs. - Workspace access & secrets: The skill changes cwd to ~/.openclaw/workspace and will rely on MCP configuration there; ensure sensitive credentials (WeCom API tokens/config) are stored securely and that you trust the skill's author. The config.json may contain docId/sheetId and potentially other secrets in your environment; don't install in environments with sensitive data until you confirm where credentials live. - Auto-load/global: Because autoLoad/global is true, the skill will be loaded widely; only install if you trust the author or run it in an isolated environment first. Actionable steps before using: 1) Ask the publisher for the authoritative source repository and for the declared runtime dependencies (mcporter path/version) and credential requirements. 2) Run the skill in an isolated test environment (no production secrets) and inspect mcporter calls to verify no unexpected side effects. 3) Patch run_mcporter to call subprocess.run with a list of args (no shell=True) or use a proper client API to avoid shell injection. 4) Ensure config.json does not contain secrets you wouldn't want the skill to access, and confirm where WeCom credentials are stored and who can read them. If you cannot verify the author or cannot fix the subprocess usage, treat the skill as high-risk and do not install it in production systems.