VenmoClaw - Give your Claw Agent a credit card - They can spend anywhere or request payment

Is your claw a shopaholic? Provide payment wallets and strict controls.

This skill is coherent with a payment integration and the single required env var (CREDITCLAW_API_KEY) makes sense, but there are several red flags to consider before installing: - The docs instruct the agent to save encrypted card files and to run a decrypt script (node decrypt.js). Confirm whether your environment provides a safe, isolated 'sub-agent' mechanism; if not, the skill explicitly says the main agent can decrypt the card, which would expose full card numbers/CVV to the agent and any logs—avoid that unless you understand and accept the risk. - The skill assumes you can run 'node' and spawn ephemeral sessions, but the skill metadata does not declare 'node' or sub-agent requirements. Ask the publisher to list required binaries/runtime and to remove the fallback that exposes decrypted cards to the main agent. - The manifest URLs point to creditclaw.com (consistent), but verify you trust that domain and its security practices before handing over an API key or saving card files. Treat the API key like a full-payment credential — do not reuse it elsewhere. - If you proceed, ensure the agent's filesystem and logs are secured (no persistent logging of decrypted card data), confirm sub-agent deletion behavior, and consider limiting the skill's autonomous invocation or adding human approval thresholds. If you cannot verify sub-agent isolation, node availability, or the publisher's trustworthiness, do not install or provide the CREDITCLAW_API_KEY.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: venmo Version: 1.0.0 The CreditClaw skill bundle facilitates financial transactions for agents but introduces significant security risks through its operational instructions. File `skill.md` contains a prompt injection attempt, advising the agent to execute a series of `curl` and `mkdir` commands to 'install locally' if it is 'unsure' of how to proceed. More critically, `encrypted-card.md` describes a 'Rail 5' workflow where the agent is instructed to download and execute a server-provided script (`decrypt.js`) to handle encrypted card data, which represents a high-risk Remote Code Execution (RCE) surface. While these features are framed as part of a legitimate financial service (IOC: `creditclaw.com`), the reliance on dynamic code execution and instructions to modify the local environment warrants a suspicious classification.