User Provision

在 Office 365（世纪互联）与 Adobe Creative Cloud 批量或单人开户——自动授权、重置密码、发通知邮件。两侧相互独立，用户可选一个或两个。USE WHEN 新增用户, 开户, 新员工开账号, 建账号, 批量开户, provision user, 加 office, 加 adobe, 给...

This skill will run a third‑party Python CLI (cloning https://github.com/eggyrooch-blip/office365-tools), install packages, and requires many sensitive secrets (Entra/Adobe service creds and SMTP passwords). Before installing: 1) Confirm the registry metadata be updated to list the required env vars and permissions; the current omission is a red flag. 2) Review the GitHub repo source yourself (or have security review it) to ensure no unexpected behavior, hardcoded exfil endpoints, or privilege escalation. 3) Use least‑privilege credentials (service principals scoped only to needed Graph API scopes) and consider short‑lived or scoped secrets; do not reuse high‑privilege admin secrets. 4) Run first in an isolated/test tenant or sandbox. 5) Prefer storing SMTP/secret values in a secrets manager rather than plaintext .env if possible. If you cannot review the repo or obtain corrected metadata, treat this skill as risky and avoid giving it production credentials or enabling unattended/autonomous invocation.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: user-provision Version: 0.5.0 The skill facilitates user provisioning for Office 365 and Adobe CC but introduces significant supply chain risk by requiring the agent to clone and execute code from an external GitHub repository (eggyrooch-blip/office365-tools). It instructs the agent to store highly sensitive credentials, including Entra App secrets, Adobe API secrets, and SMTP passwords, in a local .env file within that cloned repository. While the instructions include some defensive guidelines (e.g., not logging passwords), the pattern of fetching external code to handle broad administrative permissions (User.ReadWrite.All) is a high-risk behavior that could lead to credential exfiltration or unauthorized execution if the remote repository is compromised or malicious.