/install untrusted-binary-sandbox
Untrusted Binary Sandbox
Purpose
Use this skill to plan and execute controlled behavioral observation of untrusted software without trusting the software, its installer, or its documentation. Treat wallet, private-key, trading, MEV, arbitrage, and closed-source crypto tools as high-risk by default.
This skill does not prove safety. It reduces uncertainty for the exact artifact, configuration, runtime, and observation window tested.
Non-Negotiables
- Do not run downloaded binaries, JARs, install scripts, release artifacts, or
curl | shflows unless the user explicitly approves dynamic execution. - Prefer a sacrificial VM/VPS over a production host. Never mount production secrets, SSH keys, browser profiles, Docker socket, cloud credentials, or funded wallets.
- Never use a real private key during observation. Use invalid keys, empty throwaway wallets, or a tiny-fund wallet only in the final live tier after explicit approval.
- Pin artifact identity before execution: source URL, version, size, SHA-256, timestamp, and any signature/digest metadata.
- Keep confirmed findings separate from risk signals and unknowns. Report confidence level.
Workflow
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Scope the sample: Identify the artifact, claimed purpose, required command, required secrets, network endpoints, supported OS/CPU, and whether the user is asking for static analysis, dynamic observation, or production feasibility.
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Static triage first: Hash the artifact, inspect archive contents, review scripts/configs, run
file,readelf,objdump,strings,jar tf, or language-specific archive inspection as appropriate. Avoidlddon untrusted ELF files; usereadelf -dorobjdump -pinstead. -
Choose the lowest sufficient tier:
- Tier 0: no-run static analysis only.
- Tier 1: offline Docker run with
network_mode: none. - Tier 2: internal-only network with mock RPC/API/DNS sinks.
- Tier 3: controlled egress with allowlisted endpoints and packet/DNS logging.
- Tier 4: sacrificial VM/VPS with tiny-fund throwaway wallet for live behavior, only after prior tiers are clean.
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Build containment: Use non-root users,
read_onlyroot filesystem,cap_drop: [ALL],no-new-privileges, PID/CPU/memory limits, tmpfs for scratch, no host networking, no privileged mode, no host path mounts except read-only artifacts/config and writable logs. -
Instrument before execution: Capture process tree, syscalls, opened files, filesystem writes, DNS queries, outbound connections, child processes, resource use, and any downloaded or modified files. Prefer
straceinside Linux containers and VM-level packet capture when network is enabled. -
Execute briefly and repeat: Start with short timeouts such as 60-180 seconds. Repeat with a known-bad config, mock RPC, then controlled egress. Preserve logs and hashes after each run.
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Report with judgment: Summarize confirmed behavior, suspicious signals, unknowns, confidence, and a go/no-go recommendation. For wallet software, include a separate private-key exposure assessment.
Stop Criteria
Stop and report immediately if the sample:
- Reads SSH keys, shell history, browser profiles, cloud credentials,
.envfiles, unrelated wallet paths, or host-sensitive directories. - Writes cron/systemd/profile startup hooks, modifies shell init files, changes file permissions broadly, or downloads and executes new payloads.
- Requires root, host networking, Docker socket, privileged mode, broad host mounts, or disabled sandboxing without a clear technical need.
- Connects to endpoints not declared in config/docs, especially paste sites, generic file hosts, Telegram bot APIs, raw IPs, or newly registered domains.
- Attempts to exfiltrate key material or sends transactions before the expected safe stage.
Solana And Wallet-Specific Rules
- Never mount
~/.config/solana/id.jsonor any funded wallet. - Prefer invalid key material or an empty throwaway keypair. Do not print, transform, or store private keys in chat.
- Use a local mock RPC in Tier 2. In Tier 3, allow only explicit RPC/Jito/sender endpoints.
- Treat "encrypt your private key with this binary" as high-risk behavior, not as a safety feature.
- Measure failed transactions, priority-fee burn, Jito tips, and RPC rate-limit pressure separately from malware risk.
Resources
- Read
references/docker-sandbox.mdwhen building the actual Docker or VM containment plan. - Read
references/observation-checklist.mdwhen preparing the final evidence report. - Use
scripts/scaffold_sandbox.pyto generate a local sandbox scaffold. It creates Docker Compose files and a mock Solana RPC service, but does not execute the sample by default.
Appropriate for: In-depth documentation, API references, database schemas, comprehensive guides, or any detailed information that Codex should reference while working.
assets/
Files not intended to be loaded into context, but rather used within the output Codex produces.
Examples from other skills:
- Brand styling: PowerPoint template files (.pptx), logo files
- Frontend builder: HTML/React boilerplate project directories
- Typography: Font files (.ttf, .woff2)
Appropriate for: Templates, boilerplate code, document templates, images, icons, fonts, or any files meant to be copied or used in the final output.
Not every skill requires all three types of resources.
- 确保已安装 OpenClaw(本地或 Docker 部署)
- 在对话框中输入安装命令:
/install untrusted-binary-sandbox - 安装完成后,直接呼叫该 Skill 的名称或使用
/untrusted-binary-sandbox触发 - 根据 Skill 的参数说明提供必要输入,即可获得结构化输出
Untrusted Binary Sandbox 是什么?
Use when asked to safely inspect, sandbox, detonate, run, or dynamically observe untrusted release artifacts, closed-source binaries, JARs, installers, walle... 它是一个面向 Claude Code / OpenClaw 的 AI Agent Skill 插件,目前累计下载 55 次。
如何安装 Untrusted Binary Sandbox?
在 OpenClaw 或 Claude Code 对话框中运行命令「/install untrusted-binary-sandbox」即可一键安装,无需额外配置。
Untrusted Binary Sandbox 是免费的吗?
是的,Untrusted Binary Sandbox 完全免费,采用 MIT-0 许可证,可自由下载、安装和使用。
Untrusted Binary Sandbox 支持哪些平台?
Untrusted Binary Sandbox 跨平台运行,可在任意部署了 OpenClaw / Claude Code 的环境中使用(cross-platform)。
谁开发了 Untrusted Binary Sandbox?
由 remixmm(@remixmm)开发并维护,当前版本 v1.0.0。