tunelo

Expose local services and files to the internet through a public HTTPS URL. Designed for AI agents — when you need to let a user preview files remotely, shar...

Before installing or running this skill, consider the following: (1) do not run `curl | sh` from an unknown domain — request source code, a release page, and a cryptographic checksum (or install from a trusted package repository); (2) understand that exposing a directory or service publishes whatever is served — double-check paths to avoid leaking secrets, private keys, config files, or other sensitive data; (3) prefer using the `--local` option or a self-hosted relay (`--relay`) if you need testing without using a third-party relay; (4) if you must try it, run the installer and tunelo binary inside a disposable VM or container, or audit the install script first; (5) be cautious about allowing the agent to autonomously execute these install/run commands — require explicit user confirmation each time. If the publisher can supply a verifiable GitHub release, binary checksums, or an auditable install package, that would raise confidence and could change this assessment.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: tunelo Version: 0.2.0 The skill facilitates exposing local services and files to the public internet via a third-party relay (tunelo.net), which is a high-risk capability that can be easily abused for data exfiltration. It explicitly instructs the AI agent to use a 'curl | sh' installation method (https://tunelo.net/install.sh), a dangerous pattern for unverified remote code execution. While the stated purpose is for sharing and previews, the tool provides a functional backdoor into the local environment if the agent is prompted to serve sensitive directories like the user's home folder.