TrustMeImWorking

Automatically consume your AI API token quota on a schedule so your usage metrics always look healthy. Supports work-simulation, spread, and immediate modes...

This project implements exactly what it claims — a background daemon that makes frequent LLM API calls to consume tokens. Before installing, consider: - Ethical/legal: It intentionally falsifies usage metrics; using it may violate workplace policies or local law. - Secrets risk: The tool stores your API key in config.json and supports mTLS key files and a jwt_helper shell command. jwt_helper runs arbitrary shell commands before each run and could leak secrets if you point it at an untrusted script; mTLS requires supplying a private key file path which, if readable by others, is sensitive. Only use these features on machines you fully control. - Gateway URL: You can set a custom base_url; ensure it points to a trusted endpoint. A malicious relay could capture your API key and requests. - Persistence: The daemon and optional scheduler make the behavior long-lived. If you stop using it, remove scheduled jobs and delete stored keys. Practical recommendations: review the repository locally before running; keep config.json permissions tight; do not supply jwt_helper commands you didn't author; do not point base_url to unknown third-party relays; avoid using company credentials if this would violate policy. If you want to proceed safely, run with --dry-run first and inspect logs, and consider using a disposable/low-privilege API key.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: trustmeimworking Version: 1.0.0 The 'trust-me-im-working' skill bundle is designed to artificially inflate AI API usage metrics by automating LLM calls to 'pad' KPIs. It is classified as suspicious due to high-risk capabilities that provide a significant attack surface: specifically, the 'jwt_helper' feature in 'trustmework/engine.py' executes arbitrary user-provided shell commands via 'subprocess.run(shell=True)', and 'trustmework/scheduler.py' contains logic to modify the user's crontab for persistence. While these features are documented as part of its 'work-simulation' daemon functionality, the combination of arbitrary command execution, persistence, and the handling of sensitive API keys makes it high-risk, although no clear evidence of intentional data exfiltration to a third party was found.