trainer-buddy-pro

Your AI personal trainer that creates custom workouts from your gym photo, tracks progress and PRs, adapts training splits and exercises around injuries, and...

Trainer Buddy Pro appears to implement its core feature set locally and includes well-documented prompt-injection defenses and a reasonably safe backup script. Before installing: (1) If you require strict local-only guarantees, do not enable or build the dashboard/Sync features — the dashboard artifacts show how data could be pushed to a cloud DB if you choose to deploy them. (2) Review the dashboard-kit and any Supabase/remote deployment steps before providing any DB/API credentials; the core skill does not need them. (3) Keep the data/ directory permissions tight (chmod 700 for directory, 600 for files) as recommended, and consider disk-level encryption for health-related data. (4) Confirm the agent implementation actually enforces the SKILL.md prompt-injection rules (the SKILL.md contains defensive text, but enforcement depends on the host). (5) If you do want the dashboard, plan to audit any additional code you add for network calls and credentials handling. The package is coherent for local use but has optional components that expand scope — proceed with caution and explicit opt-in for any cloud sync.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: trainer-buddy-pro Version: 1.0.0 The skill bundle includes a shell script (`scripts/backup-workout-data.sh`) that performs automated file deletions (`rm -rf`) and uses recursive path discovery to locate the workspace root, which is a high-risk capability in an agentic environment. Furthermore, the `dashboard-kit/manifest.json` and `DASHBOARD-SPEC.md` define a synchronization mechanism that exports the entire `data/` directory—containing sensitive personal health information and injury logs—to external cloud databases (Supabase). While the bundle includes a self-authored security audit (`CODEX-SECURITY-AUDIT.md`) and explicit prompt-injection defenses in `SKILL.md`, the combination of shell-based file management and the potential for sensitive data exfiltration via the dashboard sync qualifies as suspicious.