toolguard-daemon-control

Manage macOS launchd user agents to start, stop, restart, check status, and access logs of persistent background services without sudo.

This skill appears to do exactly what it says: create and manage user-level launchd agents. Before using or allowing autonomous invocation, verify the exact command you will install and avoid passing secrets via --env (they are persisted in the plist). Prefer pointing to compiled binaries or wrapper scripts you control (not transient tools like 'go run'). Review created plist files in ~/Library/LaunchAgents and logs in ~/Library/Logs/toolguard/, and uninstall any service you don't recognize. Note: the scripts embed provided values directly into plist XML without escaping — avoid passing untrusted input that could break the plist or introduce unexpected entries.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: toolguard-daemon-control Version: 0.0.1 The skill is classified as suspicious due to a critical shell injection vulnerability in `scripts/install.sh`. The line `WORKDIR=$(eval echo "$WORKDIR")` allows arbitrary command execution if an attacker can control the `--workdir` argument, leading to a remote code execution (RCE) risk during the skill's installation process. While the skill's primary function of managing launchd services is legitimate, this specific flaw makes it dangerous. There is no evidence of intentional malicious behavior like data exfiltration or backdoor installation by the skill itself, but the vulnerability is severe.