Tmux

Remote-control tmux sessions for interactive CLIs by sending keystrokes and scraping pane output.

This skill appears internally consistent and does what it says: orchestrate and scrape tmux panes. Before installing, consider: - The skill uses the default tmux server and an 'oc-' naming convention; if you already run tmux sessions, the skill could accidentally target or kill sessions with conflicting names. Prefer running in a dedicated socket or separate user if you need isolation. - The skill drives arbitrary CLI processes inside tmux — do not run untrusted binaries via these sessions. Examples in the docs (like --dangerously-skip-permissions, --yolo, or --full-auto) are risky flags for real agent binaries; avoid using them unless you understand the implications. - The included wait-for-text.sh polls panes and can block until timeouts; review timeout settings to avoid long-running hangs. - If you need stronger containment, run tmux under a dedicated user, dedicated container, or use a custom socket (contrary to the skill's default recommendation) to avoid interacting with your interactive desktop/server tmux sessions. If you are comfortable with these caveats, the skill is coherent with its purpose.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: tmux-controller Version: 1.0.0 The `SKILL.md` instructions advise the AI agent to execute `claude` and `codex` with flags such as `--dangerously-skip-permissions`, `--full-auto`, or `--yolo`. These flags indicate a bypass of security checks or interactive confirmations, which, while not directly malicious actions by this skill, introduce a significant vulnerability by lowering the security posture of the applications run within `tmux` sessions. The `scripts/wait-for-text.sh` utility script appears robust against common shell injection vectors for its `grep` pattern argument.