tick-md

Multi-agent task coordination via Git-backed Markdown. Claim tasks, prevent collisions, track history with automatic commits.

This skill appears to implement a legitimate git-backed multi-agent coordination system, but packaging and metadata are inconsistent and the tool can modify editor configuration and (with permission) push to remote git. Before installing or enabling it: - Verify the upstream packages (tick-md and tick-mcp-server) come from a trusted source (check the npm publisher, GitHub repo links) before running npm install -g. - Do NOT allow edits to your editor MCP config or run tick sync --push until you have inspected what those edits will contain. Back up any config files listed in the docs first. - If you want to test, do so in a throwaway repository (no sensitive data, no upstream remotes) so that any automated claims/edits remain local. - Ensure required system tools (git, jq, a shell, Node >=18) are present if you plan to run suggested scripts, and confirm those dependencies are declared by the publisher. - Ask the publisher (or registry) to fix the metadata mismatches: the registry summary should accurately reflect required binaries, config paths, and any network access. If the publisher cannot explain the mismatches, treat the package as higher risk. - If you enable MCP integration, restrict it to a workspace or environment with limited access and monitor git activity; only approve pushes when you review staged changes and commit messages.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: tick-md Version: 1.3.3 The skill is designed for multi-agent task coordination using Git-backed Markdown files. It transparently declares its requirements for `git` and network access for `npm` and `git remote`. Crucially, the `SKILL.md`, `INSTALL.md`, `CHANGELOG.md`, and role-specific instructions (`roles/ORCHESTRATOR.md`, `roles/WORKER.md`) repeatedly and explicitly instruct the AI agent to ask for user approval before performing sensitive actions like pushing to remote Git repositories (`tick sync --push` or `git push`) or modifying editor MCP configuration files. This strong emphasis on user consent and proactive security measures, including a changelog entry detailing security clarifications, indicates a design focused on safe operation rather than malicious intent. The capabilities provided are necessary for its stated purpose, and the prompt injection surface is used defensively to enforce safety boundaries.