Taizi Claw Shell

Runs shell commands inside a dedicated tmux session named 'claw', returning command output and prompting before destructive commands.

This skill runs arbitrary shell commands and returns their output. Before installing, consider: 1) The skill requires tmux but does not declare it — ensure tmux is available and you accept that requirement. 2) The implementation uses node's execSync with the user command interpolated into a shell command; this can cause the host shell to evaluate parts of the input before tmux receives it (e.g., $(cmd), backticks, environment expansions, or other metacharacters), enabling unexpected or destructive host-side execution. 3) The 'dangerous command' check is basic and can be bypassed; the code only returns an error code that your agent must interpret rather than enforcing confirmation. Recommendations: only install if you trust the agent and users of the skill; ask the developer to (a) declare tmux in metadata, (b) avoid execSync with a shell (use spawn with argv or pass arguments to tmux directly to avoid shell expansion), and (c) implement an explicit confirmation step or server-side gating for destructive commands. If you cannot get these fixes, treat the skill as unsafe for untrusted input or production use.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: taizi-claw-shell Version: 1.0.0 The skill provides a tool to execute arbitrary shell commands within a persistent tmux session. It is classified as suspicious due to a command injection vulnerability in handler.js, where the sendCommand function fails to sanitize shell metacharacters (e.g., backticks or dollar signs) before passing them to execSync. While the skill includes a basic safety blacklist (isDangerous) and instructions in SKILL.md to avoid destructive commands, the implementation is inherently high-risk and lacks robust input validation.