Strapi CMS

Manage Strapi CMS content through the official @strapi/client SDK. CRUD on collection types, single types, and media files. Upload files to media library. In...

This skill appears coherent and implements a Strapi client CLI as claimed. Before installing: 1) Confirm the skill source/author (homepage is missing and owner ID is unknown). 2) Use a Strapi API token with the minimum permissions you need (prefer a read-only token if you only need inspection). 3) Be aware the skill runs local Node commands (npx tsx ...) and may cause npx to fetch dev tooling at runtime — run in an isolated environment or review package-lock.json first. 4) Schema-write and layout-write operations are destructive and should only be used on development/local instances (the docs already warn about this). 5) Ask the publisher to clarify the install metadata that claims to 'create' a node binary — it looks like a packaging/manifest inconsistency but not an indicator of malicious behavior.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: strapi Version: 1.0.0 The skill is classified as suspicious due to several risky capabilities that could be exploited via prompt injection or malicious user input. Specifically, `src/handlers/files.ts` allows reading arbitrary local files (`readFileSync`) and downloading files from arbitrary URLs (`fetch`), then uploading their content to the configured Strapi instance. This creates a significant data exfiltration risk. Additionally, `src/index.ts` exposes a `fetch` domain that enables raw HTTP requests to any path on the `STRAPI_BASE_URL`, which could be abused for unauthorized actions or reconnaissance. While these capabilities align with the stated purpose of a comprehensive Strapi management tool, they represent high-risk attack surfaces without clear malicious intent within the skill's code itself.