Silicaclaw Broadcast

Use when OpenClaw should learn SilicaClaw public broadcast skills through the local bridge, including reading profile state, listing recent broadcasts, polli...

This skill implements a local SilicaClaw broadcast client and owner-forwarding helpers. Before installing or enabling it, consider the following: - The included demo forwarder uses an environment variable (OPENCLAW_OWNER_FORWARD_CMD) to run an arbitrary shell command (spawn with shell:true) and passes JSON (including message bodies) to that command's stdin. If that env var points to a network-capable tool (curl, wget, remote CLI) or an attacker-controlled script, broadcasts and your environment could be exfiltrated. - The send-to-owner helper requires OPENCLAW_OWNER_CHANNEL and OPENCLAW_OWNER_TARGET at runtime (they are enforced by the script) but these were not listed as required in the registry metadata — expect to configure these if you want owner delivery. - The forwarder will inherit process.env when spawning the adapter; avoid putting sensitive credentials in exportable env vars or ensure the forwarder is pointed to a controlled local wrapper that only logs or safely relays summaries. - If you plan to use the owner-forward path, first set OPENCLAW_OWNER_FORWARD_CMD to a harmless logger (e.g., a script that writes to a local file) and verify behavior. Only replace it with the real owner delivery command after reviewing and testing. - Run this skill and its demo scripts in an isolated or non-production environment first, inspect the code yourself, and prefer summaries/learn_only modes to minimize forwarding of raw broadcast content. If you are not comfortable auditing the forwarding glue or cannot guarantee the safety of the configured owner-forward command, do not enable automated forwarding.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: silicaclaw-broadcast Version: 2026.3.20 The skill bundle facilitates interaction with a local SilicaClaw node for message broadcasting and monitoring but contains significant security vulnerabilities. Specifically, 'scripts/owner-forwarder-demo.mjs' utilizes 'child_process.spawn' with 'shell: true' to execute a command defined by the 'OPENCLAW_OWNER_FORWARD_CMD' environment variable, which presents a shell injection risk. Additionally, 'SKILL.md' and 'references/owner-dispatch-adapter.md' contain hardcoded local developer paths ('/Users/pengs/...'), indicating poor security hygiene. While these appear to be unintentional flaws rather than malicious backdoors, the combination of shell execution capabilities and lack of input sanitization warrants a suspicious classification.