Uniswap Self Funding Setup

Set up a complete self-funding agent lifecycle in one command. Orchestrates 5 agents to take an agent from zero to self-sustaining: provisions wallet, optionally deploys token with V4 pool, configures treasury management, registers identity on ERC-8004, and sets up x402 micropayments. Use when user wants to make their agent self-funding, earn and manage its own revenue, or configure autonomous agent operations end-to-end.

This skill orchestrates real financial operations (creating wallets, funding them, deploying tokens, creating liquidity pools, and locking funds). Before installing or running it: 1) Verify the publisher/source (no homepage or upstream repo is provided here). 2) Understand where private keys and API credentials will be supplied and ensure you control them — do not allow the skill to read your local key files unless you audit how it stores/transmits them. 3) Expect real transactions and gas costs; run in dev/testnets first and confirm all steps manually before committing mainnet funds. 4) Ask how the delegated subagents handle signing and confirmations; require explicit user prompts for any on-chain spend. 5) Limit the skill's filesystem permissions if possible (avoid letting it Read/Glob your home/.ethereum, /.privy, or other credential directories). 6) If you need higher assurance, request the full code or an auditable implementation of each subagent and review how secrets are passed between steps.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: self-funding-setup Version: 0.1.0 The skill is designed for high-privilege operations involving on-chain assets and financial transactions, including wallet provisioning, token deployment, and treasury management. While its stated purpose appears legitimate and includes some safety features, the `SKILL.md` grants the agent broad file system access tools (`Read`, `Write`, `Edit`, `Glob`, `Grep`) via its `allowed-tools` list. Although the skill's workflow only explicitly uses `Write` for specific, legitimate files, the unconstrained presence of `Read`, `Edit`, `Glob`, and `Grep` without explicit usage or path limitations in the workflow creates a significant vulnerability to prompt injection. A malicious user could potentially instruct the agent to misuse these tools for unauthorized data access or manipulation, classifying it as 'suspicious' due to risky capabilities without clear malicious intent within the skill itself.