security-sweep

Security scanner for OpenClaw skills and plugins. Scans for hardcoded secrets, dangerous exec patterns, dependency vulnerabilities, and network egress. Use w...

This skill appears to be a real scanner, but take care before running it on sensitive or third‑party code. Actions to take before using: - Inspect the scripts yourself (full-scan.sh, skill-scan.sh, quick-scan.sh) and confirm you understand what they will read and where they will write. - Do NOT use --encrypt-found on code you do not control. The feature uploads encrypted blobs to your Notion account (client-side encrypted), which still transmits ciphertext to a cloud service. - If you plan to use the Notion flow, verify the local notion-secrets.js tool is trusted and audited; store NOTION_MASTER_PASSWORD only in a secure place (and prefer interactive invocation rather than putting secrets into long-lived CI variables unless you accept the risk). - Be aware the scripts call npm audit and expect node/npm present; run them in an environment where those tools exist and where running npm audit (and potential network calls) is acceptable. - The SKILL.md suggests adding a cron job and storing report paths in agent memory — only enable that if you want periodic autonomous scans and you accept reports and their locations being recorded by the agent. If you are unsure, run scans in a disposable/isolated environment (or on a copy of the workspace) and avoid the encrypt-to-Notion and cron automation features until you’ve validated the tooling and secrets flow.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: security-sweep Version: 1.1.2 The 'security-sweep' skill is classified as suspicious due to a feature in `scripts/full-scan.sh` that allows for the exfiltration of discovered secrets to a remote Notion workspace via the `--encrypt-found` flag. While documented as a secure storage option in `README.md` and `references/notion-encryption.md`, this capability programmatically collects and transmits sensitive credentials (API keys, tokens) to an external service. The reliance on an external, unprovided script (`~/.openclaw/scripts/notion-secrets.js`) and the requirement for a `NOTION_MASTER_PASSWORD` environment variable create a high-risk path for sensitive data handling that lacks transparency and could be abused for unauthorized data exfiltration.