Salubrista HaH

Use this skill when the user needs analysis, design, implementation, evaluation, dashboards, decision scenarios, or normative guidance for integrated hospita...

This skill appears to be a coherent HaH/hospitalization copilot that bundles a large corpus of policy and agent workflow files, which is appropriate for its stated purpose. However: 1) one of the bundled docs (references/agent/AGENTS.md) contains an explicit Authorization: Bearer <token> and example webhooks to other agent gateways — that looks like a secret and a network-calling instruction embedded in the corpus and is not declared anywhere else; 2) the instructions reference a web_fetch-style call that is not listed among allowed tools in config.json (mismatch); 3) file path mappings in TOOLS.md point to /home/node/knowledge/..., whereas SKILL.md/manifest present files under references/ — clarify whether the corpus is platform-mounted or being read from the skill bundle. Before installing or enabling this skill you should: - Ask the publisher to remove any hard-coded credentials from bundled documentation (or explain why the token is safe and necessary). - Confirm which runtime tools the agent is allowed to use (can it make HTTP POSTs/webhooks?) and whether web_fetch is actually available. - Verify the meaning and safety implications of sandbox.mode = 'permissive' on your platform. - If the skill must call other internal agents, request that those credentials be supplied via properly-scoped environment variables or an operator-controlled secret store (not embedded in docs) and that the skill declare them in requires.env. - Consider running the skill in a constrained environment or with network access disabled until the above are resolved. If you want, I can produce a short checklist of questions to send to the skill author or sample text requesting removal of embedded secrets and clarification of expected network behavior.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: salubrista-hah Version: 1.0.1 The skill bundle is a highly detailed medical expert system for Chilean hospital-at-home (HaH) management. It is classified as suspicious due to the inclusion of a hardcoded Authorization Bearer token in 'references/agent/TOOLS.md' used for inter-agent communication within a 'federation,' which constitutes a credential exposure vulnerability. Additionally, 'references/agent/config.json' specifies a 'permissive' sandbox mode. However, the bundle lacks clear malicious intent, as it explicitly denies 'code_execution' and 'workspace_write' capabilities, and the instructions are strictly focused on medical administrative logic and regulatory compliance.