Rpi Cpu Monitor

树莓派 CPU 温度监控。当需要监控树莓派 CPU 温度时使用此 skill。功能：(1) 读取当前 CPU 温度，(2) 设置定时监控任务，(3) 温度超标时自动告警。支持 crontab 方案（零消耗，推荐）和 OpenClaw cron 方案。

This skill's code largely does what the description says, but inspect and adapt the script before installing. Key points to consider: - The script reads a local OpenClaw gateway token at /home/weiye/.openclaw/gateway-token; that file is a sensitive credential. Confirm the correct path for your system or change the script to accept the token via a documented environment variable (e.g., OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_TOKEN) or a configurable path. Do not install unchanged if the hard-coded path contains another user's data. - The script expects vcgencmd (Raspberry Pi utility) or /sys/class/thermal/... — ensure you're actually on a Raspberry Pi and that vcgencmd exists; the skill metadata does not declare this dependency. - The script only contacts http://localhost:3000 (local OpenClaw gateway). This reduces network-exfiltration risk, but the gateway token could be used to make other local API calls with the agent's privileges — ensure the token's scope and storage permissions are appropriate. - Consider changing file permissions on the gateway-token so it is not world-readable and test the script manually before scheduling via cron. - Prefer the crontab approach if you want minimal external model calls; if you use OpenClaw cron, confirm the messages and session parameters are safe and that repeated model invocations are acceptable. If you want a cleaner integration, ask the author to (1) remove hard-coded username paths, (2) declare required config paths / env vars, and (3) provide instructions to securely supply the gateway token.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: rpi-cpu-monitor Version: 1.0.0 The skill is classified as suspicious due to its use of persistence and access to sensitive local credentials. The `SKILL.md` file instructs the OpenClaw agent to establish a cron job via `crontab -e`, which is a powerful persistence mechanism. The script executed by this cron job (`scripts/cpu-temp-monitor.sh`) attempts to read a sensitive local `gateway-token` from a hardcoded path (`/home/weiye/.openclaw/gateway-token`) to authenticate with the local OpenClaw API. While the communication is restricted to `http://localhost:3000` and the stated purpose is legitimate (CPU monitoring and alerting), the combination of persistence, access to a sensitive local token, and the hardcoded path for this token represents a significant security risk and a vulnerability.