Reverse proxy from internet to open claw

Connect OpenClaw to the internet via Tailscale Funnel. Use when user says "connect with ecto", "setup ecto connection", "expose openclaw publicly", or "enable external access".

What to consider before installing/running: - This skill will install system software (Homebrew if missing, then Tailscale via brew) and requires sudo to start daemon processes — only run on machines you control. Review the Homebrew installer and any network install commands before executing. - It will generate and save a bearer token at ~/.openclaw/ecto-credentials.json and configure the OpenClaw gateway to accept password auth. That token grants API access to your OpenClaw instance; do not share it unless you explicitly intend to grant access. - The package-for-friend helper explicitly copies that credentials file into a shareable folder — this makes it easy to leak access. Prefer sharing transient credentials or revoke/regenerate the token immediately after use. - The registry metadata omits the real runtime requirements (tailscale, openclaw CLI, jq, curl, openssl). Treat that omission as a red flag: verify the scripts manually before running. - If you decide to use it: test in an isolated environment or VM first, inspect scripts line-by-line, and plan how to revoke access (regen token, disable Funnel) after exposure. Consider using Tailscale ACLs and tailnet admin settings instead of broad public sharing. If you want, I can: (1) point out exact lines in scripts that perform installs and create/share credentials, (2) produce a safer checklist to run these scripts manually, or (3) suggest modifications to the scripts to avoid packaging credentials for sharing.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: reverse-proxy-local Version: 1.0.1 The skill is designed to expose the OpenClaw API publicly via Tailscale Funnel, which inherently involves high-risk operations. It uses `sudo` extensively for installing and managing Tailscale, and modifies OpenClaw's configuration. The primary reason for classifying as suspicious is the `scripts/connect.sh` script's use of `curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Homebrew/install/HEAD/install.sh | /bin/bash -c` to install Homebrew, which is a common supply chain risk vector, allowing arbitrary code execution if the remote script or server is compromised. While the intent appears aligned with the stated purpose (exposing the API and sharing access), this method of installation introduces a significant vulnerability.