Project 0 - DeFi Native Prime Broker

Permissionless DeFi yield and credit on Solana via the Project 0 (P0) protocol. Deposit funds to earn yield across Solana's highest-yielding venues. Borrow s...

This skill is broadly coherent for a Solana on-chain broker, but it will ask for extremely sensitive items (your RPC endpoint and a private key file). Before installing or running it: (1) do not paste your main private key into chat — use a dedicated, low-value wallet or an external signer/hardware wallet; (2) confirm exactly which endpoints the agent will call (P0 API, wallet API, Jupiter) and that those are the official URLs; (3) ask the skill author to update requires.env to include the alternate env names it references (SOLANA_RPC_URL, HELIUS_RPC_URL, JUP_API_KEY) or explain why they aren't required; (4) prefer giving a view-only WALLET_ADDRESS for planning steps and only provide signing credentials interactively and after you review the exact transaction; (5) test with a very small amount first. If the author cannot explain the undeclared env names or insists on long-lived direct private-key access without external signing, treat it as higher risk.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: project-0 Version: 2.2.6 The skill is classified as suspicious due to a prompt injection vulnerability and a supply chain risk. The 'Agent Workflow' instructions in SKILL.md explicitly tell the agent to 'use it directly' if 'the user provided a keypair path in their message'. This, combined with the `fs.readFileSync(keypairPath, 'utf-8')` in the 'Wallet setup' code, creates an arbitrary file read vulnerability where a malicious user could instruct the agent to read sensitive files (e.g., `/etc/passwd`, `~/.ssh/id_rsa`). Additionally, the skill fetches and executes `VersionedTransaction` objects directly from the Jupiter API (`https://api.jup.ag/swap/v1/swap`) without explicit agent-side validation of the transaction's intent before signing, posing a supply chain risk if the Jupiter API were compromised.