PR Review Loop

Autonomous PR review loop with Greptile. Use when an agent creates a PR and needs to autonomously handle code review feedback — reading Greptile reviews, fixing issues, pushing fixes, re-triggering review, and auto-merging when score is 4/5+. Trigger on commands like "pr review {url}", "review my PR", or when a Greptile review webhook/poll delivers feedback.

Before installing: 1) Confirm that the agent environment will have gh (GitHub CLI), git, jq, and flock available; the skill does not declare these dependencies. 2) Carefully plan GitHub credentials: the skill needs an authenticated identity with push/merge rights — only grant the minimum scopes and prefer a repo-scoped service account or installation token. 3) Decide and enforce merge policy: the script auto-merges on heuristics (score≥4, or force-merge after 5 rounds or same score repeats) — if you want human approval for merges or architectural changes, disable autonomous merges or require escalation. 4) Provide/inspect escalation channels: SKILL.md mentions Telegram but provides no auth mechanism; clarify how alerts are sent and what credentials are involved. 5) Test in a sandbox repository first to ensure behavior matches expectations. 6) If the skill owner is unknown/trust is low, consider requiring manual invocation only (do not allow autonomous invocation) or review the code thoroughly. Additional information that would raise confidence to 'benign': explicit declared runtime requirements (binaries and env vars), a known/trusted source, and clear, limited GitHub token scope and an audited escalation mechanism.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: pr-review-loop Version: 1.0.0 The skill is designed to perform highly privileged actions, including merging pull requests and pushing code to repositories, using `gh` and `git` commands as instructed in `SKILL.md`. The `scripts/pr-review-loop.sh` script directly interpolates user-controlled arguments (`REPO`, `PR`) into `gh api` commands, which presents a potential shell injection vulnerability if the `gh` CLI or the shell's argument parsing is not robust against specially crafted input. While these actions are central to the skill's stated purpose, they represent significant risk and potential for abuse if the agent is compromised or prompted maliciously. There is no clear evidence of intentional data exfiltration, persistence, or other malicious activities within the provided files.