Potato Tipper

Skill for AI agents to setup the Potato Tipper on a Universal Profile on LUKSO (requires private key), and learn to build innovative tip-on-follow solutions.

Do not paste or upload your private key into the agent. The skill's scripts and examples require a controller PRIVATE_KEY and will broadcast transactions (set data on your Universal Profile and authorize token operator allowances). The registry metadata failing to declare those env vars is a red flag — assume the skill will ask you to provide them if you follow the 'one-click' path. If you want to use this skill safely: - Review the included code locally (repo is on GitHub) before running anything. - Run setup only from your own trusted environment (not by pasting secrets into a chat/agent) and use a test account on testnet first. - Prefer granting minimal controller permissions and temporary budgets; consider toggling permissions off after setup. - If you must interact via an agent, restrict it to read-only operations (code review, explanation, or encoding helpers) and refuse any request to supply PRIVATE_KEY or other secret values. - If the registry metadata is supposed to list required env vars, ask the publisher to correct that mismatch before trusting automated flows.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: potato-tipper Version: 1.0.2 The skill is classified as suspicious due to its direct handling of a user's private key and reliance on an external GitHub repository. The `SKILL.md` and `scripts/setup_potato_tipper.sh` explicitly instruct the AI agent to use a `PRIVATE_KEY` environment variable to sign and broadcast blockchain transactions via `forge script`. While the Solidity script (`SetupPotatoTipper.s.sol`) and the shell script appear to perform legitimate configuration actions for the 'Potato Tipper' application, the direct exposure and use of a private key by an AI agent represent a critical vulnerability. Additionally, the `setup_potato_tipper.sh` script performs a `git clone` from an external URL (`https://github.com/CJ42/potato-tipper-contracts.git`), introducing a supply chain risk if that repository were ever compromised. These are significant security risks, even without clear evidence of intentional malicious exfiltration or unauthorized actions within the provided code.