Overstory Integration

Integrates overstory Claude Code agent swarm with nanobot orchestrator. Manages agent lifecycle, SQLite mail bridge, and git worktree coordination.

This skill appears to do what it claims: it will create and use local SQLite DB files (~/.nanobot/agent_lifecycle.db and workspace/.overstory/mail.db), run the overstory CLI (which spawns tmux sessions), and run git commands that can remove worktrees. Before installing or running: 1) Inspect the full, untruncated source files in the package (the provided mail_bridge snippet was truncated in the listing) to confirm there are no hidden behaviors. 2) Ensure the overstory CLI binary you point to is trusted; this wrapper executes it directly. 3) Back up any important repositories or run in an isolated workspace, since cleanup/remove worktree operations can modify or remove worktrees. 4) If you need to limit risk, run the scripts with non-privileged user accounts or in a container/VM. If you want higher assurance, provide the complete untruncated files so I can re-check for hidden/exfiltration code.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: overstory-integration Version: 1.0.0 The skill bundle is classified as suspicious due to a path traversal vulnerability in `scripts/overstory_wrapper.py`. The `cleanup_worktree` function constructs a path using `self.workspace / ".overstory" / "worktrees" / agent_name`. If the `agent_name` input is not sanitized and contains path traversal sequences (e.g., `../`), it could allow an attacker to delete arbitrary git worktrees or other directories within the `self.workspace` or its parent directories using the `git worktree remove --force` command. This is a local file system manipulation vulnerability, but it does not demonstrate clear intentional malicious behavior like data exfiltration or backdoor installation.