OpenFunderse Participant

Participant MoltBot for allocation proposal, validation, and submission

Before installing: 1) Treat PARTICIPANT_PRIVATE_KEY as highly sensitive — use a dedicated wallet with minimal funds and never reuse admin/treasury keys. 2) Review the npm package source (@wiimdy/[email protected]) before running npx, or install/from a vetted artifact in an isolated environment. 3) The installer/bot-init will write envs and wallet files under ~/.openclaw and may restart the OpenClaw gateway — back up ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json and consider using --no-sync-openclaw-env and --no-restart-openclaw-gateway. 4) Prefer running this skill on a separated VM/container if you want to limit blast radius. 5) Verify RELAYER_URL and TRUSTED_RELAYER_HOSTS values and avoid allowing plain HTTP relayers unless you understand the network risks. If you need greater assurance, ask the publisher for the package source or a signed release and for details about exactly what bot-init writes and where.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: openfunderse-participant Version: 2.0.2 The skill is classified as suspicious due to several high-risk capabilities and potential vulnerabilities, despite lacking clear evidence of intentional malicious behavior. Key indicators include the `installCommand` in `SKILL.md` which executes remote code via `npx @wiimdy/[email protected]`, introducing a supply chain risk. The skill also handles a highly sensitive `PARTICIPANT_PRIVATE_KEY` (generating, storing backups in `~/.openclaw/workspace/openfunderse/wallets`, and using it for signing), and modifies global OpenClaw runtime state by updating `~/.openclaw/openclaw.json` and restarting the gateway. While these actions are described as part of its legitimate function, they represent significant attack surfaces and powerful capabilities that could be exploited if the external package is compromised or if configurations like `PARTICIPANT_ALLOW_HTTP_RELAYER` are set insecurely.