OpenClaw WebDAV Backup

Backup and restore an OpenClaw workspace with incremental backups, integrity verification, health checks, optional config encryption and optional WebDAV uplo...

This package appears to implement the described backup features, but review the following before running it: - Supply your own WebDAV credentials and consider using --encrypt-config before any remote upload. The scripts expect WEBDAV_URL/WEBDAV_USER/WEBDAV_PASS (via .env.backup or env vars) and a decryption password (BACKUP_ENCRYPT_PASS or .env.backup.secret) for encrypted config — the registry metadata did not list these required inputs. - Inspect ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json: the notify script will try to read it to auto-fill a Telegram bot token if you didn’t provide one. If you do not want the backup tool to read or use tokens stored there, set BACKUP_NOTIFY=0 and explicitly supply tokens only in the notify env file when needed. - Run a dry-run locally (no --upload) and inspect what files would be archived and what is excluded. Confirm the exclude lists (.env.backup, .env.backup.secret) and that no other secrets are being packaged unintentionally. - Because the package is script-based, run it in a controlled environment (or a VM/container) first to confirm behavior and to audit logs and network calls. Check the notification scripts (Telegram/WeCom/Feishu) to ensure they only call the expected endpoints when enabled. - If you need higher assurance, request an explicit manifest from the publisher that lists expected environment variables and any paths the skill will read (especially ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json).

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: openclaw-webdav-backup Version: 1.2.7 The skill is classified as suspicious due to high-risk implementation patterns and potential vulnerabilities. Specifically, `openclaw-restore.impl.sh` and `openclaw-backup.impl.sh` utilize `eval` for command execution, which presents a shell injection risk if variables are not properly sanitized. The skill's core functionality involves accessing sensitive configuration data (`openclaw.json`), encrypting it, and transmitting it to external WebDAV and notification endpoints (Telegram, WeCom, and Feishu). While these actions are aligned with the stated purpose of a backup and migration utility, the combination of broad file system access, network exfiltration of secrets, and insecure shell coding practices warrants a cautious classification.