Openclaw Memory Transfer

Zero-friction memory migration from other AI assistants (ChatGPT, Claude.ai, Gemini, Copilot, Perplexity, Cursor, Windsurf, etc.) into OpenClaw. Triggers: "m...

This skill appears to do what it says (import memories) but has several red flags you should consider before installing: - The SKILL.md instructs running a Node script (node scripts/parse-chatgpt-export.js) and shell commands (unzip, find, cat, rm) but the skill metadata does not declare Node as a required binary — clarify that requirement and only run the script in a controlled environment. - The skill's local-auto-scan steps read files under ~/.claude, ~/.cursor and project directories. If you enable those flows, the agent will see potentially sensitive files (credentials, private notes). Only allow scanning if you trust the skill and run it on a machine/environment you control. - The prompt-guided and ZIP-based flows ask you to paste or upload whole exports; these exports can contain sensitive data. Do not paste API keys, passwords, or other secrets. Inspect the exported content yourself first and redact anything sensitive. - The included parser uses shell calls (unzip, find, rm -rf via execSync). If you run it locally, run it in an isolated environment (container or VM) and review the script source. Consider running it on a copy of the ZIP rather than the original. If you want to proceed: (1) verify Node is available, (2) review scripts/parse-chatgpt-export.js line-by-line, (3) do migrations on sanitized/export copies, and (4) avoid enabling automatic local scans unless you understand exactly which paths will be read. If anything is unclear, ask the author to clarify how they detect and redact secrets and why Node isn't listed among required binaries.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: openclaw-memory-transfer Version: 1.0.1 The skill bundle is classified as suspicious due to a shell injection vulnerability in `scripts/parse-chatgpt-export.js`, where the `unzip` command is executed using unsanitized file paths provided via command-line arguments. Additionally, `SKILL.md` instructs the agent to perform broad file system scans across the user's home directory (`~`) to locate and read configuration and memory files from other AI tools (e.g., Claude, Cursor, Windsurf). While these actions are consistent with the stated purpose of 'memory migration' and the script includes path-traversal protections for the extraction process, the combination of broad read access and a command injection flaw presents a significant security risk.