OpenClaw Cursor Agent

Manage long-running Cursor CLI coding tasks through OpenClaw tools backed by tmux sessions. Use when the user asks to start a persistent coding job, inspect...

What to check before installing: - Understand the power: this skill runs shell scripts and the Cursor CLI in your filesystem and can modify project directories (it may run git commands, create files, push changes if instructed). Only install if you trust the code and intended tasks. - Metadata mismatch: the package metadata claims no required binaries, but runtime scripts require bash, tmux, python3, and the Cursor CLI (agent). Expect to install/configure these first. - Environment leakage: the Node extension launches scripts with the full process environment (process.env). Remove secrets from the agent environment or run the plugin under a separate, limited account/environment if you want to reduce risk. - Inspect toolkitRoot: the plugin requires a toolkitRoot pointing at the included cursor-agent-system. Make sure it points to the copy you reviewed. Don’t point toolkitRoot to an existing system path you don’t control. - Review restore/backup steps: documentation contains commands that copy backups into ~/.openclaw and download archives — do not run those blindly; review restore.sh and any backup contents before executing. - Run doctor and tests in an isolated environment: before trusting it with real projects, configure toolkitRoot in a sandbox directory, run openclaw cursor-agent-doctor, and perform the minimal smoke tests described in the docs. - If you need stronger guarantees: run the plugin inside a VM/isolated container or under a user with limited privileges, and avoid exposing sensitive env vars to the OpenClaw process.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: openclaw-cursor-agent Version: 1.0.0 The bundle provides a framework for managing persistent Cursor CLI coding tasks via `tmux` and `WSL`, which involves high-risk capabilities such as remote shell execution and session manipulation. Key indicators include the use of the `--trust --force` flags in `spawn-cursor.sh` to bypass Cursor CLI security prompts and the ability to inject arbitrary keystrokes into active terminal sessions via `tmux send-keys` in `send-command.sh`. While these features are aligned with the stated purpose of automating long-running development tasks and no clear evidence of intentional malice (like data exfiltration) was found, the broad permissions and the potential for the OpenClaw agent to be used as a vector for arbitrary command execution justify a suspicious classification.