Claude Usage Release

Check Claude Max plan usage limits by launching Claude Code and running /usage. Use when the user asks about Claude plan usage, remaining quota, rate limits,...

This skill appears to do what it says (automate the Claude Code CLI to run /usage) but the metadata omits important runtime requirements and local file access. Before installing or enabling it, consider: - Verify the claude CLI is trustworthy and up-to-date; this skill spawns that CLI with an automated TUI script. - Inspect the contents of ~/.claude/stats-cache.json on your system to confirm it doesn't contain secrets you wouldn't want parsed or transmitted; the SKILL.md's fallback reads this file but the skill metadata does not declare it. - Prefer a non-interactive, documented API or official CLI flag for usage data rather than PTY/expect automation where possible; expect-based automation is brittle and can accidentally surface more output than intended. - Ask the skill author to update skill.yml/registry metadata to explicitly list required binaries (expect, claude), required config paths (e.g., ~/.claude/stats-cache.json), and to clarify exactly what data is read and formatted. Given the inconsistencies, treat the skill as allowed only in a controlled environment and avoid granting it access to accounts containing sensitive tokens until these gaps are corrected.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: openclaw-claude-usage Version: 1.0.1 The skill is classified as suspicious due to its reliance on direct shell command execution via `expect -c '...'` in `SKILL.md` to interact with the `claude` CLI. While the stated purpose of checking Claude usage is benign, executing arbitrary shell commands, even hardcoded ones, introduces a significant attack surface and potential for privilege escalation or RCE if the `claude` CLI itself is compromised or if the `expect` script were to be modified or accept untrusted input. Additionally, it accesses a local file `~/.claude/stats-cache.json` for fallback, which could contain sensitive data. There is no clear evidence of intentional malicious behavior like data exfiltration to external endpoints or backdoor installation, but the high-risk capabilities warrant a 'suspicious' classification.