Nate Jones Second Brain

Set up and operate a personal knowledge system using Supabase (pgvector) and OpenRouter. Five structured tables — thoughts (inbox log), people, projects, ide...

This skill appears to be what it says, but take these precautions before installing: - Treat the Supabase service_role key as highly sensitive. Prefer not to expose it directly to client/agent runtimes. Instead host a small server-side proxy or function that holds the service_role key and exposes only the minimal endpoints the agent needs (or use anon key + strict RLS if feasible). - Use a dedicated Supabase project for this skill (do not put production or sensitive databases behind the same key). Rotate/revoke the service_role key after testing. - Remember captured text is sent to OpenRouter. Avoid sending sensitive PII, secrets, or confidential content unless you accept the third-party handling. - Test the full pipeline with non-sensitive test data first and verify RLS and access patterns in Supabase. Confirm OpenRouter model/data retention/privacy settings match your requirements. - If you cannot run a server-side proxy, at minimum limit the agent’s environment access, lock down storage of keys (avoid committing to repos), and consider short-lived keys/automated rotation. If any of the above concerns are unacceptable to you, do not install or run this skill.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: nate-jones-second-brain Version: 1.0.2 The skill is classified as suspicious due to its reliance on the `SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY`, which grants full, unrestricted access to the user's entire Supabase database, bypassing Row Level Security. While the documentation (SKILL.md, references/setup.md, references/schema.md) transparently explains this design choice for a 'single-user personal knowledge base' where the agent is a 'trusted server-side component', and configures RLS to *only* allow this role, it represents a significant privilege escalation. A compromise of the agent or the environment variables would lead to complete data exposure or manipulation. Additionally, all captured user thoughts are sent to OpenRouter for processing, which is a privacy consideration, though also transparently documented. There is no evidence of intentional malicious behavior, unauthorized data exfiltration to unknown endpoints, or prompt injection designed to subvert the agent for harmful purposes.