NAS Agent Sync

Centralizes multi-agent file storage by routing all file operations through a designated File Master agent using SSH to a Synology NAS or any SSH-accessible...

This skill is conceptually reasonable for centralizing agent files to a Synology NAS, but the SKILL.md and the registry metadata are inconsistent and the instructions ask agents to access and transmit local workspace files via sessions_send. Before installing or using it: - Expect to manually provide an SSH key/account on the File Master; the skill should explicitly declare required binaries (ssh, rsync) and the credential handling method. - Restrict the File Master to a dedicated account on the NAS with minimal permissions (dedicated home dir, no shell access beyond scp/rsync if possible). Consider a forced-command or restricted sftp/chroot account on the NAS. - Do not place private keys or long-lived secrets in agent memory or SOUL.md; store the private key only on the File Master host, with proper filesystem permissions and rotation policy. - Test with non-sensitive files first to confirm where file contents are logged or retained by the agent messaging (sessions_send). Add explicit size limits and content filters to avoid accidental exfiltration of secrets. - If you enable scheduled backups, audit the backup payload and logs and ensure backup tasks run under a least-privilege account. - Ask the skill author to update metadata to list required binaries (ssh, rsync, cron capability) and to declare what credentials the skill expects and how they should be provisioned. If you cannot confirm these changes or control of the File Master account/NAS, treat installation as higher risk and avoid sending sensitive data through the system.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: nas-agent-sync Version: 1.1.0 The skill bundle describes a legitimate NAS integration via SSH, but the `SKILL.md` instructions for the 'File Master' agent involve constructing and executing `ssh` and `rsync` commands with user-provided or inter-agent parameters (e.g., `[file]`, `[subfolder]`). This pattern introduces a significant shell injection vulnerability on the remote NAS if these parameters are not rigorously sanitized by the OpenClaw agent's execution environment, potentially allowing arbitrary command execution on the NAS. While the stated purpose is benign, the direct execution of shell commands with templated inputs represents a high-risk capability without explicit safeguards described in the skill itself.