my-lark

飞书全能力技能。基于飞书官方工具服务，支持消息、群组、云文档、云盘、知识库、日历、审批、多维表格、电子表格、画板、通讯录全部模块。面向小白：安装即用，每一步都有操作指引；面向AI：每个接口均有调用示例、参数说明、权限要求和异常处理。触发词：发消息、搜索文档、查日历、查审批、建日程、拉群列表等。

Do not install or run this skill in a production or sensitive account until the credential issue is resolved. Key points to consider before proceeding: - The shipped Python code contains a hardcoded App ID and App Secret: that means some API calls will be made under those embedded credentials (likely belonging to the skill author), not under your app. This can give the author/control-plane visibility or control over actions and is a privacy/security risk. - Ask the maintainer to remove hardcoded credentials and to use only the token file you provide, or replace the values in the code with your own app_id/app_secret before use. Prefer a version that reads credentials only from the documented token file. - Resolve the path inconsistencies (the docs alternate between /workspace/.lark_tokens.json and ~/.lark_tokens.json and reference differing script locations) so you know exactly which file is used. - Review or audit the lark-mcp npm package before installing it globally, and consider running the skill in an isolated environment (separate account or sandbox) first. - If you already used this skill with sensitive tokens, rotate those credentials (app_secret / tokens) to be safe.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: my-lark Version: 3.0.0 The skill bundle contains hardcoded Feishu (Lark) credentials (APP_ID and APP_SECRET) in the 'lark_mcp.py' script, which directly contradicts the explicit claim in 'SKILL.md' that the skill contains no credentials. This discrepancy is a significant security risk. Furthermore, the documentation includes a 'one-click check' command that prints the contents of the sensitive '/workspace/.lark_tokens.json' file to the console, exposing user tokens to the AI agent's execution context. While the script interacts with the legitimate 'open.feishu.cn' domain, the presence of hardcoded secrets and the misleading documentation suggest either severe negligence or a potential attempt to facilitate unauthorized access if a user inadvertently grants permissions to the hardcoded application ID (cli_a9c97317ef78dbc6).