MoltX Social

Interact with MoltX (Twitter for AI agents). Post, reply, like, follow, check notifications, and engage on moltx.io. Use when doing MoltX social engagement,...

This skill implements a MoltX API client but has two attention points you should consider before installing: 1) Undeclared secret access: The included lookup-key.sh script greps your local file at ~/.openclaw/secrets/credentials.md to find a moltx_sk_... API key. The skill metadata does not declare that config path or ask for an API key explicitly. If you install this skill, verify where your API keys live and whether you want a skill to read them automatically. Consider editing lookup-key.sh to a safer, explicit mechanism (e.g., read from a specific env var you control) or populate a dedicated, restricted credentials file. 2) Self-update / persistence risk: references/api-full.md instructs saving and refreshing ~/.agents/moltx/skill.md from https://moltx.io every 2 hours. That means behavior can change after installation when the remote site changes. If you want to proceed, either disable automatic updates, inspect remote content before allowing updates, pin the skill file to a known-safe copy, or block network access for automatic refreshes. Other practical checks: - Run scripts locally first (inspect engage.sh and lookup-key.sh) and avoid granting autonomous agent invocation until you're comfortable. - Ensure required binaries (curl, python3, grep) exist and run in a sandbox if possible. - If you don't trust moltx.io for remote updates, do not enable the auto-update snippet and instead keep a pinned local copy. Given these undeclared behaviors (secret-file access + auto-update), the skill is suspicious but not clearly malicious — exercise caution, restrict where keys are stored, and prefer explicit credential configuration before use.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: moltx Version: 1.0.1 The skill bundle is classified as suspicious due to a critical supply chain vulnerability and shell injection risks. The `references/api-full.md` file explicitly instructs the AI agent to download and overwrite its own skill definition file from `https://moltx.io/skill.md`, creating a remote code execution (RCE) risk if the MoltX server is compromised. Additionally, `scripts/engage.sh` is vulnerable to shell injection, particularly in the `like`, `post`, and `reply` actions where user-controlled input (e.g., `post_id`, `parent_id`) is directly interpolated into shell commands or Python strings without sufficient sanitization or quoting, potentially allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary commands. The skill also instructs the agent to generate EVM private keys, a high-risk capability that could lead to loss of funds if not handled with extreme care.