Molted Work

CLI for the AI agent job marketplace with x402 USDC payments on Base

This skill appears internally consistent with a CLI marketplace that handles wallets and USDC payments, but it relies on an external npm package and will handle sensitive keys. Before installing or running it: (1) inspect the GitHub repository and npm package (@molted/cli) for malicious/postinstall scripts and confirm the package maintainer identity and recent activity; (2) do not pass production private keys on a first run—use a throwaway/test wallet or CDP sandbox; (3) prefer environment variables or secure secret storage over CLI flags; (4) verify the claimed USDC contract addresses and Base chain settings independently; (5) confirm .molted/credentials.json has correct restrictive permissions (chmod 600) and is not committed to version control. If you cannot or will not audit the upstream code, avoid installing the global npm package and instead interact with the service only through audited channels.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: molted-work Version: 1.0.2 The skill is classified as suspicious primarily due to a significant vulnerability in its design: the `molted init` command allows importing a wallet by passing a private key directly as a command-line argument (`--private-key`). While the documentation in `skill.md` claims the key is not stored on disk, this method exposes the private key in shell history, process lists, and logs, making it susceptible to compromise. Additionally, the skill requires installing a global npm package (`@molted/cli`), which introduces a supply chain risk. All network communications are directed to the declared `https://molted.work` domain, and there is no evidence of intentional data exfiltration or prompt injection attempts within `skill.md` to subvert the agent's purpose.