Mobayilo Voice (Beta)

Place outbound phone calls via Mobayilo with safe defaults (preview mode by default) and explicit live execution.

This skill appears to be what it claims: a guarded wrapper around the Mobayilo 'moby' CLI that defaults to dry-run. Before installing or running it, check the following: - Confirm you trust the moby CLI binary and its install method. The repo's runbook suggests running a remote installer via curl | sh (https://mobycli.mobayilo.com/install.sh). Audit that script or prefer an OS package/build-from-source path instead. - Be aware the adapter reads config/defaults.yaml (or the path set by MOBY_CONFIG) and will use MOBY_CLI_PATH if present. Review the config file for CLI path, host, and log locations. - The code honors MOBY_ALLOW_NON_PROD_HOST and MOBY_REQUIRE_APPROVAL. If you do not want non-prod hosts or automated live calls, keep MOBY_ALLOW_NON_PROD_HOST unset and keep the approval gate enabled or avoid passing --execute/--approved in automated workflows. - The adapter queries a local agent HTTP endpoint (127.0.0.1:7788) and may open a macOS browser tab. If you run in a restricted environment, ensure that local agent endpoint is acceptable. - The skill writes logs/telemetry JSONL to local files (masked phone numbers by default). Confirm log paths are acceptable and that sensitive data handling meets your policies. - Because registry metadata only lists MOBY_HOST but the code reads additional env vars, inspect and set MOBY_CONFIG, MOBY_CLI_PATH, MOBY_ALLOW_NON_PROD_HOST, and MOBY_REQUIRE_APPROVAL explicitly as needed. If these behaviors are acceptable and you validate the moby CLI source, this skill is coherent with its stated purpose. If any of the above is unexpected, review the source and run the scripts in a sandbox before enabling in production.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: mobayilo-voice Version: 0.2.0-beta.1 The skill is classified as suspicious due to its extensive use of `subprocess.run` and `subprocess.Popen` to execute an external `moby` CLI binary and manage local processes (e.g., `moby agent run`, `os.kill` for process management). While arguments are passed safely as lists, preventing direct shell injection, the `cli_path` and `twilio_sdk_path` are configurable via `config/defaults.yaml` or environment variables. An attacker with control over these configurations could redirect the skill to execute arbitrary malicious binaries. Additionally, the `docs/runbook.md` contains `curl -fsSL https://mobycli.mobayilo.com/install.sh | sh` for CLI installation, which is a supply chain risk, though not executed by the skill itself. The skill does implement several guardrails (host policy, destination validation, phone masking) and shows no clear intent of self-exploitation or other malicious behavior.