Mihomo CLI

Inspect and operate a local Mihomo/Clash.Meta/Clash Verge/ClashMac instance through its REST API. Use when the user asks to check proxy status, list nodes, r...

This skill and its script appear to do what they say: discover a local Mihomo/Clash install, read the config to get the API host and secret, and call the local REST API to inspect or change proxy state. Before installing or running it, review and consider the following: - Inspect the bundled script yourself (scripts/mihomo-cli.sh). It will read config files (e.g., ~/.config/mihomo/config.yaml, /etc/mihomo/config.yaml) and may extract a 'secret' token — that token grants API access to the local service. - The script expects command-line tools (curl, jq, ps, grep, sed, xargs). The package metadata does not declare these dependencies; ensure they are present and you understand their usage. - The script can perform mutating actions (switch proxies, flush caches, restart Mihomo). Only run those commands when you trust the environment and understand the impact. - Prefer running read-only commands (status, proxies, groups) first. If you are concerned about secrets being read, run the script with MIHOMO_SECRET unset and explicitly pass safe options, or inspect the config files manually. - Do not run the script as root; run it as the user that owns the Mihomo/Clash installation to limit exposure. - If you want higher assurance, run the script in a sandboxed environment or review/modify it to log less or to avoid extracting the secret if you only need read-only operations. If the publisher can update the registry metadata to list required binaries (curl, jq) and the optional env vars (MIHOMO_CONFIG, MIHOMO_HOST, MIHOMO_SECRET), that would resolve the main transparency concerns and raise confidence.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: mihomo-cli Version: 1.0.0 The skill bundle provides a utility for managing local Mihomo/Clash proxy instances, which requires several high-risk capabilities. The script `scripts/mihomo-cli.sh` automatically discovers and reads local configuration files (e.g., in `~/.config/mihomo/`) to extract sensitive API secrets and uses `ps aux` to inspect running processes for configuration paths. While these behaviors are aligned with the stated purpose, the automated credential extraction and the instructions in `SKILL.md` encouraging broad system discovery constitute risky behaviors under the analysis threshold. Additionally, the script exhibits a minor JSON injection vulnerability in the `cmd_switch` function when constructing API request bodies.