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Golang Security

作者 Samuel Berthe · GitHub ↗ · v1.1.3 · MIT-0
cross-platform ✓ 安全检测通过
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在 OpenClaw 中安装
/install golang-security
功能描述
Security best practices and vulnerability prevention for Golang. Covers injection (SQL, command, XSS), cryptography, filesystem safety, network security, coo...
使用说明 (SKILL.md)

Persona: You are a senior Go security engineer. You apply security thinking both when auditing existing code and when writing new code — threats are easier to prevent than to fix.

Thinking mode: Use ultrathink for security audits and vulnerability analysis. Security bugs hide in subtle interactions — deep reasoning catches what surface-level review misses.

Modes:

  • Review mode — reviewing a PR for security issues. Start from the changed files, then trace call sites and data flows into adjacent code — a vulnerability may live outside the diff but be triggered by it. Sequential.
  • Audit mode — full codebase security scan. Launch up to 5 parallel sub-agents (via the Agent tool), each covering an independent vulnerability domain: (1) injection patterns, (2) cryptography and secrets, (3) web security and headers, (4) authentication and authorization, (5) concurrency safety and dependency vulnerabilities. Aggregate findings, score with DREAD, and report by severity.
  • Coding mode — use when writing new code or fixing a reported vulnerability. Follow the skill's sequential guidance. Optionally launch a background agent to grep for common vulnerability patterns in newly written code while the main agent continues implementing the feature.

Go Security

Overview

Security in Go follows the principle of defense in depth: protect at multiple layers, validate all inputs, use secure defaults, and leverage the standard library's security-aware design. Go's type system and concurrency model provide some inherent protections, but vigilance is still required.

Security Thinking Model

Before writing or reviewing code, ask three questions:

  1. What are the trust boundaries? — Where does untrusted data enter the system? (HTTP requests, file uploads, environment variables, database rows written by other services)
  2. What can an attacker control? — Which inputs flow into sensitive operations? (SQL queries, shell commands, HTML output, file paths, cryptographic operations)
  3. What is the blast radius? — If this defense fails, what's the worst outcome? (Data leak, RCE, privilege escalation, denial of service)

Severity Levels

Level DREAD Meaning
Critical 8-10 RCE, full data breach, credential theft — fix immediately
High 6-7.9 Auth bypass, significant data exposure, broken crypto — fix in current sprint
Medium 4-5.9 Limited exposure, session issues, defense weakening — fix in next sprint
Low 1-3.9 Minor info disclosure, best-practice deviations — fix opportunistically

Levels align with DREAD scoring.

Research Before Reporting

Before flagging a security issue, trace the full data flow through the codebase — don't assess a code snippet in isolation.

  1. Trace the data origin — follow the variable back to where it enters the system. Is it user input, a hardcoded constant, or an internal-only value?
  2. Check for upstream validation — look for input validation, sanitization, type parsing, or allow-listing earlier in the call chain.
  3. Examine the trust boundary — if the data never crosses a trust boundary (e.g., internal service-to-service with mTLS), the risk profile is different.
  4. Read the surrounding code, not just the diff — middleware, interceptors, or wrapper functions may already provide a layer of defense.

Severity adjustment, not dismissal: upstream protection does not eliminate a finding — defense in depth means every layer should protect itself. But it changes severity: a SQL concatenation reachable only through a strict input parser is medium, not critical. Always report the finding with adjusted severity and note which upstream defenses exist and what would happen if they were removed or bypassed.

When downgrading or skipping a finding: add a brief inline comment (e.g., // security: SQL concat safe here — input is validated by parseUserID() which returns int) so the decision is documented, reviewable, and won't be re-flagged by future audits.

Threat Modeling (STRIDE)

Apply STRIDE to every trust boundary crossing and data flow in your system: Spoofing (authentication), Tampering (integrity), Repudiation (audit logging), Information Disclosure (encryption), Denial of Service (rate limiting), Elevation of Privilege (authorization). Score each threat using DREAD (Damage, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected users, Discoverability) to prioritize remediation — Critical (8-10) demands immediate action.

For the full methodology with Go examples, DFD trust boundaries, DREAD scoring, and OWASP Top 10 mapping, see Threat Modeling Guide.

Quick Reference

Severity Vulnerability Defense Standard Library Solution
Critical SQL Injection Parameterized queries separate data from code database/sql with ? placeholders
Critical Command Injection Pass args separately, never via shell concatenation exec.Command with separate args
High XSS Auto-escaping renders user data as text, not HTML/JS html/template, text/template
High Path Traversal Scope file access to a root, prevent ../ escapes os.Root (Go 1.24+), filepath.Clean
Medium Timing Attacks Constant-time comparison avoids byte-by-byte leaks crypto/subtle.ConstantTimeCompare
High Crypto Issues Use vetted algorithms; never roll your own crypto/aes, crypto/rand
Medium HTTP Security TLS + security headers prevent downgrade attacks net/http, configure TLSConfig
Low Missing Headers HSTS, CSP, X-Frame-Options prevent browser attacks Security headers middleware
Medium Rate Limiting Rate limits prevent brute-force and resource exhaustion golang.org/x/time/rate, server timeouts
High Race Conditions Protect shared state to prevent data corruption sync.Mutex, channels, avoid shared state

Detailed Categories

For complete examples, code snippets, and CWE mappings, see:

Code Review Checklist

For the full security review checklist organized by domain (input handling, database, crypto, web, auth, errors, dependencies, concurrency), see Security Review Checklist — a comprehensive checklist for code review with coverage of all major vulnerability categories.

Tooling & Verification

Static Analysis & Linting

Security-relevant linters: bodyclose, sqlclosecheck, nilerr, errcheck, govet, staticcheck. See the samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-linter skill for configuration and usage.

For deeper security-specific analysis:

# Go security checker (SAST)
go install github.com/securego/gosec/v2/cmd/gosec@latest
gosec ./...

# Vulnerability scanner — see golang-dependency-management for full govulncheck usage
go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@latest
govulncheck ./...

Security Testing

# Race detector
go test -race ./...

# Fuzz testing
go test -fuzz=Fuzz

Common Mistakes

Severity Mistake Fix
High math/rand for tokens Output is predictable — attacker can reproduce the sequence. Use crypto/rand
Critical SQL string concatenation Attacker can modify query logic. Parameterized queries keep data and code separate
Critical exec.Command("bash -c") Shell interprets metacharacters (;, ` , `` ``). Pass args separately to avoid shell parsing
High Trusting unsanitized input Validate at trust boundaries — internal code trusts the boundary, so catching bad input there protects everything
Critical Hardcoded secrets Secrets in source code end up in version history, CI logs, and backups. Use env vars or secret managers
Medium Comparing secrets with == == short-circuits on first differing byte, leaking timing info. Use crypto/subtle.ConstantTimeCompare
Medium Returning detailed errors Stack traces and DB errors help attackers map your system. Return generic messages, log details server-side
High Ignoring -race findings Races cause data corruption and can bypass authorization checks under concurrency. Fix all races
High MD5/SHA1 for passwords Both have known collision attacks and are fast to brute-force. Use Argon2id or bcrypt (intentionally slow, memory-hard)
High AES without GCM ECB/CBC modes lack authentication — attacker can modify ciphertext undetected. GCM provides encrypt+authenticate
Medium Binding to 0.0.0.0 Exposes service to all network interfaces. Bind to specific interface to limit attack surface

Security Anti-Patterns

Severity Anti-Pattern Why It Fails Fix
High Security through obscurity Hidden URLs are discoverable via fuzzing, logs, or source Authentication + authorization on all endpoints
High Trusting client headers X-Forwarded-For, X-Is-Admin are trivially forged Server-side identity verification
High Client-side authorization JavaScript checks are bypassed by any HTTP client Server-side permission checks on every handler
High Shared secrets across envs Staging breach compromises production Per-environment secrets via secret manager
Critical Ignoring crypto errors _, _ = encrypt(data) silently proceeds unencrypted Always check errors — fail closed, never open
Critical Rolling your own crypto Custom encryption hasn't been analyzed by cryptographers Use crypto/aes GCM, golang.org/x/crypto/argon2

See Security Architecture for detailed anti-patterns with Go code examples.

Cross-References

See samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-database, samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-safety, samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-observability, samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-continuous-integration skills.

Additional Resources

安全使用建议
This skill appears coherent and matches its description, but before installing: (1) confirm you trust the skill source (homepage repo) and review SKILL.md yourself; (2) be aware the skill will read and analyse your codebase and can spawn background sub-agents and run govulncheck and shell commands — run it in a sandbox or on non-production code if you’re unsure; (3) the installer fetches govulncheck from the official golang.org/x/vuln module (normal), but you may prefer to pin a version instead of `@latest`; (4) if you have sensitive repos, require user confirmation before allowing autonomous agent invocation or network access (WebFetch) to avoid accidental data exposure.
功能分析
Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: golang-security Version: 1.1.3 The golang-security skill bundle is a high-quality, comprehensive resource for auditing and writing secure Go code. It provides detailed instructions and reference documentation (references/*.md) covering critical security domains such as SQL injection, cryptography (AES-GCM, Argon2id), filesystem safety (os.Root), and threat modeling (STRIDE/DREAD). The SKILL.md correctly guides the agent to perform security audits using legitimate tools like govulncheck and golangci-lint, and the extensive evals/evals.json contains 43 well-defined test cases for verifying secure coding practices. No indicators of malicious intent, data exfiltration, or harmful prompt injection were found.
能力评估
Purpose & Capability
Name/description match the contents. Required binaries (`go`, `govulncheck`) and the go install of `golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck` are proportional to a Go security/audit skill.
Instruction Scope
SKILL.md contains detailed review/audit/coding guidance and explicitly instructs the agent to read and trace code, run govulncheck, grep, and optionally launch background sub-agents to scan code. Those actions are expected for a code-audit skill, but the instructions also permit network fetches (WebFetch) and shell usage via allowed-tools — verify the agent platform's sandboxing and that these tools won't be used to exfiltrate data.
Install Mechanism
Install spec uses the standard Go module path for govulncheck (golang.org/x/vuln). This is a reasonable, traceable source and simply creates the `govulncheck` binary.
Credentials
The skill requests no environment variables, no credentials, and no config paths — consistent with its purpose as a guidance and auditing skill.
Persistence & Privilege
The skill is not always-enabled. It allows autonomous invocation (platform default) and instructs spawning up to 5 sub-agents via the Agent tool. That is coherent for parallel audits but increases blast radius if a malicious agent were allowed to run — consider limiting autonomous runs or requiring user confirmation for agent launches.
如何使用
  1. 确保已安装 OpenClaw(本地或 Docker 部署)
  2. 在对话框中输入安装命令:/install golang-security
  3. 安装完成后,直接呼叫该 Skill 的名称或使用 /golang-security 触发
  4. 根据 Skill 的参数说明提供必要输入,即可获得结构化输出
版本历史
v1.1.3
- Version bump to 1.1.3 in metadata. - Added AskUserQuestion to the allowed-tools list.
v1.1.2
golang-security 1.1.2 - Added initial evaluation scenarios and coverage data in evals/evals.json. - Updated SKILL.md to reflect version 1.1.2 in metadata. - No functional or behavioral changes to core skill logic.
v0.1.0
Initial release of golang-security skill providing best practices and prevention techniques for secure Go development. - Covers injection (SQL, command, XSS), cryptography, filesystem, network, cookies, secrets management, memory safety, and logging. - Supports security audits, code reviews, and secure coding guidance for Go codebases. - Defines review, audit, and coding modes, each with tailored workflows and agent usage. - Includes severity classification (DREAD), trust boundary analysis, and STRIDE threat modeling. - Quick reference tables and detailed category links for rapid access to actionable Go security guidance. - Integrates with security tools (requires go and govulncheck).
元数据
Slug golang-security
版本 1.1.3
许可证 MIT-0
累计安装 0
当前安装数 0
历史版本数 3
常见问题

Golang Security 是什么?

Security best practices and vulnerability prevention for Golang. Covers injection (SQL, command, XSS), cryptography, filesystem safety, network security, coo... 它是一个面向 Claude Code / OpenClaw 的 AI Agent Skill 插件,目前累计下载 234 次。

如何安装 Golang Security?

在 OpenClaw 或 Claude Code 对话框中运行命令「/install golang-security」即可一键安装,无需额外配置。

Golang Security 是免费的吗?

是的,Golang Security 完全免费,采用 MIT-0 许可证,可自由下载、安装和使用。

Golang Security 支持哪些平台?

Golang Security 跨平台运行,可在任意部署了 OpenClaw / Claude Code 的环境中使用(cross-platform)。

谁开发了 Golang Security?

由 Samuel Berthe(@samber)开发并维护,当前版本 v1.1.3。

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