Search across multiple self-hosted Git instances including Gitea, Forgejo, GitLab, and Codeberg. Aggregates search results from Codeberg.org, Gitea.com, Open...

This skill appears to implement the advertised functionality, but review and mitigation steps are recommended before installing: - Inspect the full _web_search implementation (the provided snippet is truncated). Confirm whether it invokes shell commands or external endpoints and whether it uses environment variables — this affects injection risk. - Note that API tokens you add are stored in plaintext in instances.json under a hard-coded SKILL_DIR (/root/.openclaw/workspace/skills/git-federation-searcher). If you will add private instances, use least-privilege/read-only tokens and ensure file permissions are restrictive, or modify the code to store secrets safely. - Ensure curl is available on the host or adapt the code to use Python's HTTP libraries; the registry/metadata does not declare curl as a requirement even though the code calls it via subprocess. - Because the skill runs subprocesses to perform network calls, run it in a sandboxed environment (or non-privileged account) if you are unsure about trusting its source. - If you need higher assurance, ask the publisher to: (1) remove hard-coded absolute paths or make them configurable, (2) document any environment variables used (e.g., SearXNG URL), and (3) avoid shell invocation in favor of requests/urllib to reduce command injection risk. If you can retrieve and review the full git_federation_searcher._web_search function and confirm there are no shell/unsanitized string executions there, it would raise confidence. Without that, treat the skill as suspicious and proceed with caution.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: git-federation-searcher Version: 1.0.0 The skill is classified as suspicious due to a critical shell injection vulnerability found in `git_federation_searcher.py`. The `_web_search` function uses `subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True)` where `cmd` is constructed using an f-string that includes user-controlled input (`query`), allowing for arbitrary command execution. Additionally, the skill stores user-provided API tokens in plain text within `instances.json`, posing a data security risk. There is no evidence of intentional malicious behavior like data exfiltration or backdoor installation, classifying these issues as vulnerabilities rather than malice.