FounderClaw — Multi-agent engineering team for OpenClaw. 29 skills, 6 agents (CEO + 5 departments), structured workspace, auto mode, vision sub-agent routing...

Before installing or running anything from this package: 1) Inspect install.sh and uninstall.sh (don't run curl | bash without reviewing). 2) Review the install steps that will symlink into ~/.agents/skills/, create ~/.openclaw/founderclaw/, and modify OpenClaw config — back up current config first. 3) Audit the Chrome extension files and browse daemon code if you care about browser privacy: the tool reads Chromium cookie DBs and uses Keychain/secret stores to decrypt cookies (you will see OS prompts). 4) If you don't want proactive/autonomous behavior, avoid enabling 'proactive' features and consider disabling autonomous model invocation for this skill or only using user-invoked flows. 5) Only provide any LLM API keys (Anthropic, etc.) if you understand which tests or features require them. 6) If you are unsure, run the package in an isolated environment (VM or throwaway account) first and verify what install.sh does. These patterns can be legitimate for a browser-driven QA/agent system, but they carry sensitive side effects and merit manual review.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: founderclaw Version: 2.1.0 FounderClaw is a comprehensive multi-agent engineering system for OpenClaw that provides a persistent browser daemon, automated QA, security auditing, and design tools. The bundle includes a Playwright-based browser manager (browse/src/browser-manager.ts), a cookie import utility for authenticated testing (browse/src/cookie-import-browser.ts), and an installer (install.sh) that configures a multi-agent workspace. While the system possesses high-privilege capabilities such as reading local browser cookies and modifying OpenClaw configurations, these are documented features aligned with its purpose. The code implements security best practices, including bearer token authentication for the local daemon and redaction of sensitive data in activity logs (browse/src/activity.ts). No evidence of malicious intent, unauthorized data exfiltration, or hidden backdoors was found.