Antenna — Inter-Host OpenClaw Messaging (v1.3.4)

Send messages between OpenClaw instances over reachable HTTPS via the built-in /hooks/agent webhook.

Prerequisites

Each participating host needs:

1. OpenClaw gateway running with hooks enabled (hooks.enabled: true)
2. A reachable HTTPS endpoint for /hooks/agent
3. Antenna agent registered in gateway config (agents section)
4. hooks.allowedAgentIds includes "antenna"
5. hooks.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes includes "hook:antenna"
6. Host-specific Antenna config in:
   • antenna-config.json
   • antenna-peers.json

Normal path:

• Run antenna setup to generate the live runtime files.
• Use antenna-config.example.json and antenna-peers.example.json as tracked reference templates only.

Notes:

• Peers do not need to share one tailnet or one central hub.
• Tailscale Funnel is a convenient default, but reverse proxies, VPS/domain-hosted HTTPS, Cloudflare Tunnel, and similar paths also work.

Architecture

Messages flow through a script-first relay pipeline:

1. Sender runs antenna-send.sh which builds an [ANTENNA_RELAY] envelope and POSTs it to the recipient's /hooks/agent endpoint.
2. Recipient gateway dispatches to the dedicated Antenna agent.
3. Antenna agent writes the raw inbound message to a temp file using the write tool (structured API call, no shell metacharacter concerns).
4. Antenna agent execs antenna-relay-file.sh with the file path — the script feeds the message to antenna-relay.sh which deterministically parses, validates, and formats it.
5. Antenna agent calls sessions_send to inject the formatted message into the target session.
6. Message appears persistently in the target conversation thread.

The LLM never performs relay parsing, encoding, or transformation; the scripts do all processing.

Trust Model

Antenna trust is layered:

• Peer URL — where to reach that installation
• Hook bearer token — protects webhook ingress
• Per-peer runtime identity secret — authenticates claimed sender identity when configured. Verified via constant-time comparison; no plaintext secrets land in relay logs.
• Peer allowlists — explicit inbound and outbound peer lists
• Inbound session allowlist — limits where inbound relay may deliver (full session keys only)
• Envelope marker guard — messages whose bodies or header values contain the envelope markers [ANTENNA_RELAY] / [/ANTENNA_RELAY] are rejected as malformed (prevents envelope smuggling)
• Message freshness window — each message carries a timestamp:; stale or future-dated messages are rejected. Defaults: 300s max age, 60s max future skew. Tunable via .security.max_message_age_seconds and .security.max_future_skew_seconds.
• Rate limiting — per-peer and global throttles
• Untrusted-input framing — reminds receiving agents the relayed content may be external
• Log sanitization — peer-supplied values stripped of control characters before logging
• File-permission audit — antenna status flags any token/secret file looser than chmod 600
• Self-id required — sender refuses to run without self_id configured; it does not fall back to $(hostname)

For peer onboarding, Antenna now prefers Layer A encrypted bootstrap exchange using age. Legacy raw-secret export refuses non-TTY output (no piping runtime identity secrets into captured automation).

Configuration

Live runtime files are local installation state:

• antenna-config.json
• antenna-peers.json

Tracked reference files live beside them:

• antenna-config.example.json
• antenna-peers.example.json

Use antenna setup for normal installation; use the *.example.json files for schema reference or manual recovery.

antenna-config.json

{
  "max_message_length": 10000,
  "default_target_session": "agent:betty:main",
  "relay_agent_id": "antenna",
  "relay_agent_model": "openai/gpt-5.4-nano",
  "local_agent_id": "\x3Cyour-agent-id>",
  "install_path": "\x3Cabsolute-path-to-this-skill-directory>",
  "log_enabled": true,
  "log_path": "antenna.log",
  "log_max_size_bytes": 10485760,
  "log_verbose": false,
  "mcs_enabled": false,
  "mcs_model": "sonnet",
  "inbox_enabled": false,
  "inbox_auto_approve_peers": [],
  "inbox_queue_path": "antenna-inbox.json",
  "allowed_inbound_sessions": ["agent:betty:main", "agent:betty:antenna"],
  "allowed_inbound_peers": ["\x3Cpeer-a>", "\x3Cpeer-b>"],
  "allowed_outbound_peers": ["\x3Cpeer-a>", "\x3Cpeer-b>"],
  "rate_limit": {
    "per_peer_per_minute": 10,
    "global_per_minute": 30
  },
  "security": {
    "max_message_age_seconds": 300,
    "max_future_skew_seconds": 60
  }
}

Key fields:

• relay_agent_model — use a full provider/model ID, not a local alias
• local_agent_id — used by local CLI conveniences when expanding bare names to full session keys like agent:\x3Cid>:main
• install_path — absolute path to this skill directory
• allowed_inbound_sessions — inbound delivery allowlist (full session keys, e.g. agent:betty:main)
• allowed_inbound_peers / allowed_outbound_peers — peer allowlists
• rate_limit.* — inbound abuse controls
• security.max_message_age_seconds / max_future_skew_seconds — freshness-window tolerance (defaults shown; omit the block to use defaults)

antenna-peers.json

{
  "\x3Cyour-host-id>": {
    "url": "https://\x3Cyour-reachable-hostname>",
    "token_file": "secrets/hooks_token_\x3Cyour-host-id>",
    "peer_secret_file": "secrets/antenna-peer-\x3Cyour-host-id>.secret",
    "exchange_public_key": "age1...",
    "agentId": "antenna",
    "display_name": "My Host",
    "self": true
  },
  "\x3Cremote-peer-id>": {
    "url": "https://\x3Cremote-reachable-hostname>",
    "token_file": "secrets/hooks_token_\x3Cremote-peer-id>",
    "peer_secret_file": "secrets/antenna-peer-\x3Cremote-peer-id>.secret",
    "exchange_public_key": "age1...",
    "agentId": "antenna",
    "display_name": "Remote Host"
  }
}

Key fields:

• url — reachable HTTPS hook base URL
• token_file — bearer token for that peer
• peer_secret_file — per-peer runtime identity secret
• exchange_public_key — peer's age public key for Layer A exchange
• self — marks the local host entry

Usage

Send a message

scripts/antenna-send.sh \x3Cpeer> "Your message here"
antenna msg \x3Cpeer> "Your message here"                              # recipient resolves target session
antenna msg \x3Cpeer> --subject "Config sync" "Here's the block you need..."
antenna msg \x3Cpeer> --session "agent:\x3Cagent-id>:mychannel" "Your message"  # explicit session override
echo "Long message body..." | antenna send \x3Cpeer> --stdin
antenna send \x3Cpeer> --dry-run "Test message"

Session resolution: When --session is omitted, target_session is left out of the envelope entirely. The recipient resolves from their own default_target_session config. You don't need to know another host's internal session layout.

Peer pairing (interactive wizard)

antenna pair                          # Full interactive wizard
antenna pair --peer-id myserver       # Pre-fill peer ID

The wizard walks through keypair generation, public key sharing, optional ClawReef invite, bundle creation, optional bundle email send when mail tooling is available, exchange, connectivity test, and first message — with Next/Skip/Quit at each step. Also auto-offered at the end of antenna setup.

Peer onboarding / bootstrap exchange (manual)

Preferred encrypted flow:

antenna peers exchange keygen
antenna peers exchange pubkey
antenna peers exchange initiate \x3Cpeer-id> --pubkey \x3Cage1...> --print
antenna bundle verify \x3Cbundle-file>                         # read-only: decrypt & sanity-check before importing
antenna bundle verify \x3Cbundle-file> --json                  # machine-readable verdict
antenna bundle verify \x3Cbundle-file> --force-expired         # inspect a past-expiry bundle without importing
antenna bundle verify \x3Cbundle-file> --no-decrypt            # treat file as already-decrypted bundle JSON
antenna peers exchange import \x3Cbundle-file>                 # refuses expired bundles
antenna peers exchange import \x3Cbundle-file> --force-expired # disaster-recovery override
antenna peers exchange reply \x3Cpeer-id>

Optional direct-send convenience (email):

antenna peers exchange initiate \x3Cpeer-id> \
  --pubkey \x3Cage1...> \
  --email [email protected] \
  --send-email [--account \x3Chimalaya-account-name>]

Legacy/manual fallback:

antenna peers exchange \x3Cpeer-id> --export         # interactive TTY only; refuses to pipe secrets
antenna peers exchange \x3Cpeer-id> --import \x3Cfile>
antenna peers exchange \x3Cpeer-id> --import-value \x3Chex>

Peer registry updates:

antenna peers add \x3Cpeer-id> --url \x3Chttps-url> --token-file \x3Cpath>   # first time only
antenna peers add \x3Cpeer-id> --url \x3Cnew-url> --force                 # update existing: merges only the flags you pass

Notes:

• Secure Layer A requires age and age-keygen
• Export never materializes plaintext bundle JSON on disk; jq streams directly into age. Import decrypts to a temp file but cleans up on return, validation failure, preview failure, write failure, and Ctrl-C (SIGINT/SIGTERM).
• antenna bundle verify \x3Cfile> is a read-only sanity check — it decrypts in place, validates shape / endpoint URL / freshness, and prints a safe summary (never the raw hooks token or identity secret). It never writes to antenna-peers.json or antenna-config.json. Use it before peers exchange import when a bundle comes from an untrusted or unclear channel.
• Expired bundles are refused by default; use --force-expired only for genuine disaster recovery.
• Optional direct-send requires himalaya. The sender email is resolved from your Himalaya TOML config (${HIMALAYA_CONFIG:-~/.config/himalaya/config.toml}, [accounts.\x3Cname>] email = "...") — there is no antenna@localhost fallback and no free-text From: override. Pass --account \x3Cname> to pick a specific configured account; interactive flows use selection-only UX.
• Email is convenience transport only, not part of the trust model.
• Import shows a preview and asks before allowlist changes unless --yes is used.
• antenna peers add refuses to overwrite an existing peer without --force; --force does a field-level merge so unspecified peer fields (including exchange_public_key, self, and any future metadata) are preserved.
• antenna peers remove prunes peer-scoped allowlist entries (allowed_inbound_peers, allowed_outbound_peers, peer-scoped inbound sessions) so removing a peer does not leave stale allowlist debris behind. Peer secret files are intentionally left in place; secret deletion is an explicit operator action (see antenna doctor section 6b for secrets-hygiene warnings about leftover files).

Session allowlist management

antenna sessions list                             # Show allowed inbound session targets
antenna sessions add antv3                        # Bare name → auto-expanded to agent:\x3Clocal>:antv3
antenna sessions add "agent:marie:lab1"            # Cross-agent: use full session key
antenna sessions remove antv3                     # Remove (bare names are expanded)
antenna sessions remove "agent:betty:main" --force # Core sessions need --force

Controls which session targets inbound messages can request via allowed_inbound_sessions in antenna-config.json.

Convention: full session keys everywhere. The allowlist stores full keys like agent:betty:main and agent:marie:lab1. The relay requires full keys from senders — bare names are rejected. The CLI auto-expands bare names to agent:\x3Clocal_agent>:\x3Cname> for convenience when adding/removing, but the stored value is always the full key.

Core sessions (agent:\x3Clocal>:main, agent:\x3Clocal>:antenna) are protected from removal unless --force is used. Supports batch add/remove.

Health and status

antenna doctor
antenna uninstall --dry-run
antenna uninstall
antenna peers list
antenna peers test \x3Cid>
antenna status
antenna log --tail 50

antenna doctor includes warn-only drift audits that complement the hard config/permission checks:

• Section 1b — Peer-State Drift. Audits allowed_inbound_peers, allowed_outbound_peers, and peer-scoped inbound sessions in antenna-config.json against antenna-peers.json. Orphan peer IDs (allowlist entries for peers that no longer exist) are warnings, never failures. Catches the nexus / bruce-era debris class automatically.
• Section 6b — Secrets Directory Hygiene. File-side counterpart to 1b. Warns on orphan peer-scoped secret / token files in secrets/ (antenna-peer-\x3Cid>.secret, hooks_token_\x3Cid>, peer_secret_\x3Cid> whose \x3Cid> is no longer in antenna-peers.json), backup-pattern leftovers (.bak*, .backup*, ~, .old), loose secrets/ directory permissions (target 700), loose per-file permissions on secret-shaped files (target 600), and unknown-shape files inside secrets/.

Testing

antenna test \x3Cmodel>
antenna test-suite --tier A
antenna test-suite --model \x3Cm>
antenna test-suite --models "\x3Cm1>,\x3Cm2>"
antenna test-suite --report

Model tests emit a per-run TEST_NONCE and match both success and pre-delivery rejections by that nonce, so parallel or historical runs cannot contaminate each other's verdicts and auth / peer / rate-limit failures return promptly instead of waiting for the full timeout. Tests drive gateway config through the CLI/helper path with a single batched restart rather than restarting per operation.

Inbox (optional approval queue)

When inbox_enabled is true in config, inbound messages from peers not in inbox_auto_approve_peers are queued for review instead of being relayed immediately. Auto-approved peers bypass the queue and relay instantly (current behavior).

antenna inbox                        # list pending messages (table view)
antenna inbox count                  # pending count (for heartbeat/cron checks)
antenna inbox show \x3Cref>             # full message body for a ref
antenna inbox approve all            # approve everything pending
antenna inbox approve 1,3,5-7       # selective approval (commas and ranges)
antenna inbox deny all               # reject everything pending
antenna inbox deny 2,4               # selective denial
antenna inbox drain                  # output delivery JSON for approved, remove denied
antenna inbox clear                  # purge all processed items

Delivery flow: antenna inbox drain outputs one JSON line per approved message with sessionKey and message fields. The calling agent (your primary assistant) reads these and calls sessions_send for each. This avoids re-entering the relay agent via /hooks/agent.

Configuration:

{
  "inbox_enabled": false,
  "inbox_auto_approve_peers": ["trusted-peer-id"],
  "inbox_queue_path": "antenna-inbox.json"
}

Notes:

• Disabled by default — existing behavior is unchanged
• Auto-approve list lets trusted peers bypass the queue (progressive trust)
• Queue file is local runtime state (gitignored)
• Ref numbers auto-increment and support range selection
• When inbox is enabled, the relay agent only needs exec (not sessions_send), reducing its required permissions

Heartbeat / cron integration:

Add to your HEARTBEAT.md:

## Antenna inbox check
- Run: `antenna inbox count`
- If > 0: run `antenna inbox list` and mention it

Or set up a cron job for automated handling:

Check antenna inbox. If there are pending messages from peers
in [trusted-peer-id], approve and drain them. For anything else,
summarize the queue and ask me.

Conversational usage: Ask your assistant "any Antenna messages waiting?" — it can run antenna inbox list, you review, then say "approve 1 and 3, deny 2" and it handles the rest.

ClawReef — Peer Discovery

clawreef.io is the optional community registry for Antenna hosts:

• Discover peers — browse and search the directory
• Send invites — ClawReef delivers them via Antenna to the recipient's default session
• Accept & pair — accepting an invite starts the normal antenna pair flow locally

ClawReef stores webhook credentials (hooksToken, identitySecret) for push delivery alongside public keys and endpoints — standard webhook-provider behavior. It does not store messages, private age keys, or message content. All trust decisions remain local to Antenna.

The pairing wizard (antenna pair) offers ClawReef invites as an alternative to manual encrypted exchange. Setup also displays ClawReef info after completion.

Security Notes

• Relay agent is script-first and non-interpreting
• Inbound sessions are allowlisted (full session keys only)
• Sender peer must be allowlisted on both inbound and outbound sides
• Per-peer identity secret can authenticate sender claims; comparison is constant-time
• Envelope marker guard rejects messages whose bodies or headers contain [ANTENNA_RELAY] / [/ANTENNA_RELAY]
• Message freshness window rejects stale or future-dated envelopes (defaults: 300s age, 60s future skew)
• Sender refuses to run without configured self_id (no $(hostname) fallback)
• Legacy raw-secret export refuses non-TTY output
• Encrypted bundle export never writes plaintext; encrypted bundle import cleans up plaintext on every exit path (return / fail / SIGINT / SIGTERM)
• Expired encrypted bundles are refused at import (--force-expired is the disaster-recovery override)
• Email send for bootstrap/pubkey resolves sender address from Himalaya TOML config; no antenna@localhost fallback, no free-text From: override
• Tokens and secrets are file-backed and should be chmod 600; antenna status audits permissions
• Relay temp files are created with umask 077, chmod 0600, and shredded before unlink on cleanup
• Setup preserves an existing gateway hooks.token rather than overwriting it
• Relayed content is framed as potentially untrusted input
• Rate limiting throttles inbound bursts; transaction locking protects inbox and rate-limit state under concurrent access

Troubleshooting

• Gateway won't start: Run antenna doctor
• Want a clean slate: Run antenna uninstall (use --dry-run first if you want a preview)
• 401 Unauthorized: wrong hook bearer token
• 403 Forbidden: session prefix/agent restrictions or peer policy mismatch
• Relay rejected: peer not allowlisted, session not allowlisted, or identity secret mismatch
• Relay rejected: timestamp out of range (stale|future): peer clock skew exceeds freshness window; sync clocks or widen .security.max_message_age_seconds / .security.max_future_skew_seconds
• Relay rejected: marker in body|headers: envelope-marker guard working as intended; rephrase or encode any literal [ANTENNA_RELAY] / [/ANTENNA_RELAY] content
• self-id not configured - run antenna setup: sender is missing host identity in antenna-config.json; there is no $(hostname) fallback
• Encrypted exchange fails immediately: age / age-keygen missing
• Bundle expired - refusing import: request a fresh bundle from the peer, or pass --force-expired only for disaster recovery. To inspect an expired bundle without importing, use antenna bundle verify \x3Cfile> --force-expired.
• antenna bundle verify: decrypt failed: the bundle was encrypted for a different age public key than yours. Ask the peer to re-initiate against your current antenna peers exchange pubkey.
• antenna bundle verify: endpoint URL rejected: the bundle's from_endpoint_url is not a valid HTTPS URL (e.g. main, bare host). Refuse to import; ask the peer to regenerate after fixing their self-peer URL.
• antenna doctor: self-peer URL is not a valid URL: your own self peer entry has a malformed url. Fix it in antenna-peers.json or rerun antenna setup with a valid --url \x3Chttps://host>. REF-1313 now rejects malformed URLs at input time, but stale pre-fix entries still need to be corrected.
• antenna doctor: orphan peer references in config allowlists (warning, section 1b): allowlists in antenna-config.json reference peer IDs that no longer exist in antenna-peers.json. Remove the stale IDs with antenna peers remove \x3Cid> on any current peer (which also prunes its allowlist entries), or edit antenna-config.json directly.
• antenna doctor: orphan secret file / stale backup file / secrets/ dir is not 700 (warnings, section 6b): hygiene findings on the secrets/ directory. None of these can authenticate a peer that isn't in the registry, but they are real leak-surface / drift signals. Move orphan files to secrets.retired/ (or delete), rotate or remove .bak* leftovers, and run chmod 700 secrets/ / chmod 600 secrets/\x3Cfile> to tighten permissions.
• Email send fails: could not resolve email for account: add email = "..." under [accounts.\x3Cname>] in your Himalaya TOML config, or pass --account \x3Cother> to pick a configured account that has an email set
• Email send fails: himalaya not installed: install himalaya or fall back to sending the bundle file by hand
• Legacy export refused - not a TTY: antenna peers exchange \x3Cpeer> --export must run in an interactive terminal; switch to antenna peers exchange initiate for automated or remote operator handoff
• Message sent but not visible: ensure tools.sessions.visibility = "all" and tools.agentToAgent.enabled = true on the receiver; the relay agent uses cross-agent sessions_send, which requires both settings. Also ensure sandbox: { mode: "off" } on the Antenna agent — sandboxed sessions silently clamp visibility to tree, blocking cross-agent delivery
• Exec denied / allowlist miss: ensure relay agent instructions use only simple commands (no $(...), heredocs, or chaining); the antenna-relay-file.sh wrapper accepts a file path only
• Repeated approval prompts: ensure Antenna agent has sandbox: { mode: "off" } in registration. Default advice is not to set tools.exec.security or tools.exec.ask on the Antenna agent — explicit exec overrides cause silent relay failure (fixed in v1.2.14). If you've intentionally customized tools.exec on the agent, setup reruns now preserve your overrides instead of wiping them.
• antenna peers add refuses to update an existing peer: by design — pass --force to update fields on a paired peer; without it, the command refuses to clobber trust material

File Inventory

skills/antenna/
├── SKILL.md
├── README.md
├── CHANGELOG.md
├── antenna-config.example.json
├── antenna-peers.example.json
├── antenna-peers.json
├── antenna-config.json
├── antenna.log
├── install.sh
├── bin/
│   └── antenna.sh
├── scripts/
│   ├── antenna-send.sh
│   ├── antenna-relay.sh
│   ├── antenna-relay-file.sh           # v1.1.8 — file-based relay input (preferred)
│   ├── antenna-relay-exec.sh            # v1.1.6 — base64 wrapper (legacy fallback)
│   ├── antenna-pair.sh                  # v1.1.9 — interactive peer pairing wizard
│   ├── antenna-health.sh
│   ├── antenna-peers.sh
│   ├── antenna-doctor.sh
│   ├── antenna-exchange.sh
│   ├── antenna-inbox.sh
│   ├── antenna-model-test.sh
│   └── antenna-test-suite.sh
├── references/
│   ├── ANTENNA-RELAY-FSD.md          # Relay architecture contract
│   └── issues.md                      # Known issues / gaps tracker
├── docs/                               # Repo-only (operator / historical)
│   ├── full-removal-checklist.md
│   ├── SECURITY-ASSESSMENT-v1.0.20.md
│   ├── RED-TEAM-REPORT-v1.0.4.md
│   ├── LAYER-A-SECRET-EXCHANGE-PLAN.md
│   └── SECRET-EXCHANGE-OPTIONS.md
└── agent/
    ├── AGENTS.md
    └── TOOLS.md

Notes:

• antenna-config.json, antenna-peers.json, and antenna-inbox.json are local runtime files (gitignored)
• antenna-config.example.json and antenna-peers.example.json are tracked reference templates

Gateway / Agent Registration

antenna setup handles all of this automatically and is safe to rerun (e.g., after a clawhub update). Setup forces sandbox.mode = "off" and seeds a default tools.deny list only when absent. It preserves an existing gateway hooks.token and, on rerun, preserves any tools.exec overrides the operator has intentionally set on the Antenna agent.

On each host:

• agent antenna registered in OpenClaw config under agents with:
  • agentDir and workspace both pointing to the Antenna agent/ directory
  • sandbox: { mode: "off" } (required — sandbox silently clamps session visibility, breaking cross-agent relay)
  • restrictive tools.deny (block web, browser, image, cron, memory tools)
  • Default advice: do not set tools.exec.security or tools.exec.ask on the Antenna agent — explicit exec overrides cause silent relay failure (see v1.2.14 changelog). If you've intentionally customized these, setup reruns now preserve your overrides rather than wiping them.
• hooks.allowedAgentIds includes "antenna"
• hooks.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes includes "hook:antenna"
• tools.sessions.visibility set to "all" (required for cross-agent sessions_send)
• tools.agentToAgent.enabled set to true

Support

• 📧 Email: [email protected]
• 🐛 Issues: github.com/ClawReefAntenna/antenna/issues
• 🔒 Security: See SECURITY.md