Agent Attestation

Portable reputation system for agents v3 - Ed25519 signatures, input validation, handoff KV

This package appears to implement what it claims (local attestation, Ed25519 signing, and a handoff KV) and contains no network calls or requests for unrelated credentials, but it stores private keys and identity/reputation data unencrypted in default relative directories. Before installing or running: 1) review and run the code in a sandbox/isolated environment; 2) set keys_dir and KV directory to a secure absolute path outside any shared workspace; 3) restrict filesystem permissions (e.g., chmod 600 on private key files); 4) consider adding encryption at rest or protecting private keys with a passphrase or OS keyring; 5) install a vetted version of the 'cryptography' library from PyPI and review dependency versions; 6) audit the code yourself (or ask the author) if you need assurance there are no network endpoints beyond the included files. If you cannot ensure secure storage for the generated keys, treat the skill as risky for production use.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: agent-attestation Version: 3.0.2 The skill bundle implements an agent attestation and identity persistence system. While the code uses strong cryptography (Ed25519) in `attestation_system_v3.py` and includes explicit security warnings in `attestation_system_v3.py`, `example_usage.py`, and `handoff_kv.py` about storing unencrypted private keys and identity data on disk, this practice constitutes a significant vulnerability. The direct storage of unencrypted private keys and sensitive identity information on the filesystem, even with warnings, represents a high-risk capability that could lead to compromise if the designated storage directories (`./keys`, `./attestation_kv`) are not adequately secured by the operating environment. This falls under the 'suspicious' category as a vulnerability, not malicious intent, due to the inherent risk of the capability itself.