status-web

小雨 bot 状态监测页面技能包。提供实时监控 OpenClaw Agent 工作状态、定时任务和系统健康状况的 Web 界面。包含静态缓存机制确保快速加载，美化 UI 界面，以及独立部署能力。使用场景：需要监控 AI Agent 运行状态、查看最近工作记录、管理定时任务、检查系统健康状况。

Key things to consider before installing: 1) The package's files contain hardcoded paths (/home/admin/openclaw/workspace), expect an 'openclaw' CLI, and will exec shell commands — it needs privileges to read agent memory and run the agent CLI. 2) Several inconsistencies exist: the SKILL.md/start instructions reference different script names/paths than provided (start.sh vs start-server.sh; server.js location), and the module get-scheduled-tasks-simple is required by server.js but not included — the package appears incomplete or mispackaged. 3) The POST /api/chat endpoint can forward messages to the OpenClaw agent using a hardcoded mainSessionId after a simple magic-string check; there is no real authentication. If you expose this server to a network, an attacker who discovers the endpoint or magic phrase could interact with the agent. 4) Recommended actions: run this only in an isolated environment (container or VM), do not bind to 0.0.0.0 on public interfaces, require/implement proper authentication for /api/chat, review and fix path/script mismatches (ensure start script points to the correct server.js and included modules exist), remove or harden any ability to exec the OpenClaw CLI from web-exposed endpoints, and audit the memory files the code will read to confirm no sensitive data is exposed. If you cannot verify or fix these issues, treat the package as untrusted and do not run it on production agents.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: status-web Version: 1.0.0 The `server.js` file uses `child_process.execSync` to execute `openclaw agent` commands with user-provided input from the `/api/chat` endpoint. While there is an attempt to sanitize the user's `message` (`message.replace(/"/g, '\"').replace(/\$/g, '\$')`), this sanitization is insufficient to prevent all potential shell injection vulnerabilities, posing a risk of Remote Code Execution (RCE). Additionally, this 'hidden chat' feature explicitly allows users to perform prompt injection against the AI agent. Although there is no clear evidence of intentional malicious behavior like data exfiltration or backdoors, the presence of a shell injection vulnerability and direct prompt injection vector makes this skill bundle suspicious.