Skill Auto Attach

Monitors workspace for new or updated .html, .md, .txt files and automatically attaches them to Telegram messages instead of showing code.

This skill contains clear mismatches and some risky behavior — do not enable it without review. Specific recommendations: (1) Inspect and modify the script to use the correct workspace path (prefer using the runtime-provided workspace path or an environment variable rather than /home/elodyzen). (2) Add explicit extension filtering (only .html, .md, .txt) and/or a whitelist/confirmation step before sending files. (3) Declare and check for required binaries (inotifywait / inotify-tools and the openclaw message tool) in SKILL.md. (4) Avoid hard-coded paths for logs and workspace; use configurable paths. (5) Test in an isolated environment (with no secrets) to verify behavior. (6) Consider adding an opt-in prompt or per-file approval before transmitting files to Telegram. If you cannot make these changes or verify the message tool's target is the intended Telegram channel, treat the skill as potentially leaking sensitive files and do not install it in production.

Package: skill-auto-attach (xpi) Version: 1.0.0 Description: Automatic file attachment skill for Telegram The skill's stated purpose is to automatically attach new or updated 'documentation files' (e.g., .html, .md, .txt) from the OpenClaw workspace to Telegram messages. However, the `auto-attach.sh` script monitors for *any* regular file creation or modification within the hardcoded `WATCH_DIR` (`/home/elodyzen/.openclaw/workspace`) and sends it via the `openclaw message send` command. This lack of file type filtering means that sensitive files (e.g., configuration files, private keys, source code with embedded secrets) that are not intended to be shared could be inadvertently copied to `/tmp` and then sent to the configured Telegram channel. While the script includes cleanup for temporary files and uses standard tools, the broad scope of file monitoring combined with the hardcoded watch directory presents a significant potential for unintended data leakage, making it suspicious. The security relies heavily on the user's understanding of what files are in their workspace and the security of the `openclaw` tool itself.