Persistent Code Terminal

Persistent per-project coding terminal (tmux). Run Codex CLI (codex exec) inside a stable session; mobile/SSH friendly.

This skill appears to be what it claims: a set of shell scripts that create per-project tmux sessions and optionally run the Codex CLI inside them. Before installing, consider the following: - Autonomy risk: if you enable OpenClaw auto-routing (openclaw.config.dev.autoCodeRouting = true) or allow the agent to invoke skills autonomously, the agent may run the Codex CLI which can perform edits, run builds/tests, and push to remotes. Auto-routing is disabled by default, but enable it only if you trust the agent and the Codex CLI behavior. - Review the scripts: they write .pct-state.json and .pct-routing.log into your repo and use tmux capture/ send-keys to run arbitrary shell commands — inspect the code if you have sensitive data in the repo or require stricter audit controls. - Codex CLI network access: the skill does not request credentials, but the Codex CLI (external tool) may perform network calls. Make sure you understand your Codex CLI's sandbox/permission model and what remote auth (SSH keys, Git credentials) it can use. - Scope of install: install the skill at project scope (repo/skills/...) rather than globally, unless you want it available everywhere. That reduces accidental cross-repo execution. - Small metadata notes: SKILL.md reads OPENCLAW_CONFIG_DEV_AUTO_CODE_ROUTING as an env override (not declared in registry metadata) and lists apt in metadata while the registry install spec lists brew — this is minor but worth being aware of. If you plan to use automated/Codex-driven pushes, test in a safe repository first, run the included doctor script, and consider setting PCT_CODEX_NO_DEFAULT_FLAGS=1 or keeping autoCodeRouting disabled until you are confident in the workflow.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: persistent-code-terminal Version: 1.2.0 The skill's core functionality involves executing arbitrary shell commands via `persistent-code-terminal-send.sh` and `persistent-code-terminal-codex-exec.sh`, driven by AI interpretation of user input (as instructed in `SKILL.md` and processed by `persistent-code-terminal-route.sh`). This design presents a significant Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability if the AI agent can be prompted to generate and execute malicious commands. While the skill includes mitigating factors like Codex's `--sandbox workspace-write` flag, opt-in auto-routing (`openclaw.config.dev.json`), and security advisories in `README.md`, the direct execution of AI-generated commands without robust input sanitization for the commands themselves makes it a high-risk component. There is no evidence of intentional malicious behavior such as data exfiltration or backdoors.