OpenFunderse Strategy

Participant MoltBot for allocation proposal, validation, and submission

This pack appears to do what it says (a participant bot) but installs and runtime actions make persistent, high-impact changes. Before installing: (1) review the npm package @wiimdy/[email protected] source and maintainer history; (2) never use treasury/admin keys — create a dedicated wallet and keep keys offline where feasible; (3) prefer running install with --no-sync-openclaw-env and --no-restart-openclaw-gateway to avoid automatic global mutations, and manually inspect any files written to ~/.openclaw; (4) ensure PARTICIPANT_TRUSTED_RELAYER_HOSTS and PARTICIPANT_ALLOW_HTTP_RELAYER are set conservatively to avoid talking to untrusted relayers; (5) back up and audit ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json before and after changes; (6) if you must automate submission, enable PARTICIPANT_REQUIRE_EXPLICIT_SUBMIT or similar safeguards; and (7) consider testing in an isolated VM or non-production environment first. If you want a firmer permit/deny decision, request the npm package source (or a signed release) and the exact install commands the operator intends to run so those artifacts can be examined.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: openfunderse-strategy Version: 2.0.2 The skill is classified as suspicious due to its high-risk capabilities and reliance on external, unreviewed code. It requires access to a sensitive `PARTICIPANT_PRIVATE_KEY`, modifies global OpenClaw configuration (`~/.openclaw/openclaw.json`), restarts the OpenClaw gateway, and performs network communication to an external `RELAYER_URL` (with an option to disable HTTPS), as detailed in `SKILL.md`. The installation process relies on `npx @wiimdy/[email protected]`, whose source code is not provided, introducing a supply chain risk. While the `SKILL.md` includes explicit security warnings and safety gates, these capabilities present a significant attack surface if the underlying package is malicious or if the AI agent is compromised via prompt injection.