Writing Style Iterator

个性化写作风格记忆系统。在帮用户写作时，加载用户的写作风格 按用户偏好生成内容，并从用户的修改中自动提取风格规则，不断学习用户的写作风格，越用越好用。 当用户的请求涉及写作、改写、润色等文字创作场景时自动激活。

This skill appears to implement a local, git-backed writing-style memory that reads and writes your files and keeps a history. Before installing or enabling it consider: - The skill will create ~/.writing-style-iterator and commit copies of whatever files you let it handle; check and approve this directory and its retention policy. Back up important files first. - The SKILL.md expects git and standard shell tools but the skill metadata doesn't declare them — confirm the runtime environment has the expected tools and that you trust them. - The instructions tell the agent to modify user files without asking ('Don't ask Y/N'). If you want control, require the skill to prompt before writing or limit it to producing suggestions only. - Limit the skill's scope: prefer configuring explicit directories it may operate on (e.g., a project folder) rather than allowing arbitrary absolute paths. - Ask the author (or require an updated skill) to: (1) declare required binaries (git, diff, cp), (2) declare the config path (~/.writing-style-iterator), (3) remove the 'do-not-ask' mandate or make it configurable, and (4) provide a homepage/source and code review so you can inspect how diffs and rule-extraction are implemented. If you cannot get these changes, treat the skill as high-risk: either run it in a restricted environment or do not enable autonomous invocation and require explicit user consent for every file-write operation.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: writing-style-iterator Version: 0.1.0 The skill bundle is classified as suspicious due to multiple shell injection vulnerabilities present in the `SKILL.md` instructions. Commands like `cp`, `diff`, and `git commit` incorporate unsanitized placeholders such as `<用户文件的绝对路径>`, `<用户文件>`, `<文件名>`, and `<修改摘要>`. If the OpenClaw agent does not rigorously sanitize these inputs before execution, a malicious user could inject arbitrary shell commands, leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE). While there is no explicit evidence of intentional malicious behavior like data exfiltration or backdoor installation, the severe RCE risk stemming from these vulnerabilities warrants a 'suspicious' classification.