Wps Skill

WPS Office automation skill supporting document creation, Markdown conversion, and image-text layout.

What to check before installing/using: - Review the included Python files (especially scripts/main.py and any network-related modules) for unexpected network calls (search for requests, urllib, socket) or code that uploads files/credentials. The SKILL.md and config.json indicate app_id/app_secret are stored in plaintext — don't put real production credentials in config.json; prefer environment variables or a secret store. - The SKILL uses pyautogui (GUI automation) and subprocess to open/drive WPS. That can send keystrokes to whatever window is active — test in a VM/sandbox or disable GUI automation if you don't need it. - SKILL.md's pip install line is incomplete. Before running, install and audit the actual dependencies observed in the code (python-docx, openpyxl, python-pptx/pptx, Pillow, pyautogui, pyperclip, requests, etc.) and run tests in an isolated environment. - Verify the code provenance: SKILL.md references a GitHub URL but the registry lists source unknown. Prefer installing only skills with a verifiable upstream repository and commits you can inspect. - If you plan to allow autonomous agent invocation, limit the skill's permissions or disable autonomous use until you're comfortable with the code (or run behind policies that prevent file exfiltration). Consider running static scans and grepping the repository for suspicious patterns (hardcoded endpoints, outbound IPs, base64/exec/eval, writing credentials to network locations). - If confidence is required before deployment, request the upstream repository or ask the author for a signed release and for credential handling to be changed to environment variables/secrets rather than plaintext config.json.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: wps-skill Version: 1.3.0 This skill is classified as suspicious due to multiple critical vulnerabilities that could lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE) and arbitrary file system access via prompt injection. Specifically, the `scripts/main.py` script directly passes unsanitized user input to `pyautogui.typewrite` (allowing arbitrary keystroke injection into any active application) and `subprocess.Popen` (creating shell injection vulnerabilities). Additionally, user-controlled file paths are used in `os.path.join` without proper sanitization, leading to path traversal risks. The `SKILL.md` document acknowledges some of these risks but the code does not mitigate them, and sensitive API credentials (`app_id`, `app_secret`) are stored in plain text in `config.json`.